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THE INDEPENDENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
PRESS CLAUSE UNDER EXISTING LAW 
C. Edwin Baker* 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE SPEECH AND PRESS CLAUSES 
In 1973, Jerome Barron asked the most important First Amendment 
question regarding the press: “freedom of the press for whom?”1 Four 
years earlier, in 1969, relying very heavily on a newspaper precedent, 
Associated Press v. United States,2 the Supreme Court gave an answer to 
Barron’s question. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,3 probably its 
most famous broadcasting case, the Court asserted that “[i]t is the right 
of the viewers and listeners . . . which is paramount.”4 This claim—that 
the audience’s interests are paramount—could not have been made when 
in a public school a child refused to salute the flag on the basis of 
conscience.5 In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,6 the 
speaker’s interests, or more precisely the would-be non-speaker’s 
interests or, even better put, the individual’s liberty, was paramount.7 
The difference between Barnette and Red Lion, as well as the Court’s 
                                                          
 *  Nicholas Gallicchio Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank Marvin 
Ammori, David Anderson, Ellen Goodman, and Michael Madow for very helpful comments on an 
earlier draft. 
 1. JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM?: THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO 
Mass MEDIA (1973). As the celebration of this conference recognizes, Barron effectively asked that 
question before the Court’s decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 
1641-43 (1967). 
 2. 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
 3. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). At three crucial places in its reasoning, the Court invoked 
Associated Press. Id. at 387, 390, 392. 
 4. Id. at 390. 
 5. Specifically, on the basis of religion, but the Court held that point not to be significant 
and, thus, did not rely on the religion clauses. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
629, 634-35 (1943). 
 6. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 7. See id. at 633-34, 641-42. 
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reasoning in Associated Press, illustrates how the rationale for 
constitutional protection of the press differs from that of the protection 
of individuals. These different rationales lead, in turn, to somewhat 
different protection for the press and for individuals, with the press 
sometimes receiving special protections, but also with it sometimes 
being subject to regulations as structured enterprises that could not be 
applied to individuals. These different rationales even explain why 
regulation of the press sometimes actually serves the values embodied in 
the First Amendment—as Justice Black argued in Associated Press.8 
This Article aims to support each of these assertions. 
A ubiquitous understanding of the constitutional guarantee of press 
freedom is that it aims to protect a Fourth Estate or, more expansively, to 
protect media entities because of their instrumental contribution to 
democracy and a free society. Nevertheless, despite the powerful 
presentation of this view by Justice Potter Stewart9 (and also Justice 
William Brennan),10 the Court has never explicitly recognized that the 
Press Clause involves any significant content different from that 
provided to all individuals by the prohibition on abridging freedom of 
speech.11 The result is a common view that, at best, the Press Clause 
means that individuals have the right to disseminate their views as well 
as to voice them. According to this reading of Court decisions, the Press 
Clause is not meaningfully separate from the Speech Clause. 
                                                          
 8.  
It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for freedom of the press which 
prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command that the 
government was without power to protect that freedom. The First Amendment, far from 
providing an argument against application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful 
reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential 
to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a 
command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not 
afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom. 
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). 
 9. Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press”, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975). 
 10. William J. Brennan, Jr., Address at the Dedication of the S. I. Newhouse Center for Law 
and Justice, Rutgers University (Oct. 17, 1979), in 32 RUTGERS L. REV 173, 174-75 (1979). 
 11. David Anderson points out that from the 1930s through the 1960s, the Court often 
invoked and appeared to rely on the Press Clause. David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 429, 448 (2002). However, all those cases were ones that one suspects individual 
speakers would receive the same protection except, maybe, for special animosity to prior restraints 
as applied to the press. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716-19 (1931). Interestingly, Near, a press 
case, is the first case where the Court invalidated a state law on the basis of the First Amendment. 
Id. at 717-23. 
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In fact, the Court is sometimes portrayed as repudiating a separate 
role for the Press Clause. Most often cited for this proposition is Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.12 The lower court, possibly 
relying on the pedigree of Justice Stewart’s dubious proposition that the 
Court had never applied the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan13 actual 
malice standard to non-media defendants,14 held that these non-media 
speakers receive less protection. On this basis, it found Dun & 
Bradstreet liable. In contrast, by adding Justice White’s concurrence to 
the opinion of the four dissenters, a majority in Dun & Bradstreet 
explicitly rejected giving the non-media defendants less First 
Amendment protection for their defamatory speech than is given to 
media defendants.15 In addition to these five, the three member plurality 
opinion, while affirming the lower court result, explicitly withheld 
approval of the lower court’s premise. Instead, Justice Powell found that 
the protection provided to the defendants in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.16 
did not apply because here the negligently false defamatory speech 
(assertedly) did not involve an “issue of public concern.”17 No member 
of the Court recognized a difference in protection of individuals and the 
media, and a majority explicitly rejected the proposition in this context. 
Sometimes these opinions are taken to mean that the two clauses have 
no operationally different content. 
That reading of the Court’s decision does not follow. A principle of 
no greater protection for the press against defamation suits does not 
logically rule out the converse—that individuals receive greater rights in 
these contexts. More plausible though, Dun & Bradstreet could merely 
mean that any difference in protection provided by the two clauses does 
                                                          
 12. 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985). 
 13. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 283 (1964). 
 14. Stewart, supra note 9, at 635. Stewart’s interpretation of New York Times Co. is curious. 
Although the Times did choose to accept the civil rights leaders’ advertisement and, therefore, the 
ad could be seen as speech of a media defendant, it was also speech of the non-media defendants 
who signed and placed the ad. Their speech was not the speech of the media, although they did use 
the media. The Court applied the same actual malice standard to these individual defendants, 
apparently belying Stewart’s subsequent interpretation. Thus, the only way to understand Stewart’s 
position is not that the media have special rights but that whoever uses the media for their speech 
has these greater rights. 
 15. Justice White said he agreed with “Brennan that the First Amendment gives no more 
protection to the press in defamation suits than it does to others exercising their freedom of 
speech”—not, thereby, ruling out the converse, that the press receives less protection. Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 773 (White, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, however, also said that 
“in the context of defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than 
those enjoyed by other[s].” Id. at 784 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 16. 418 U.S. 323, 330-32 (1974). 
 17. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 757. 
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not come into play in this context. In other contexts, however, their 
rights vary, with individuals some times and the press at other times 
having greater rights.18 In fact, defamatory speech is a peculiar locus to 
test the thesis of independent meaning of the Press Clause. If individual 
liberty is the core of the speech freedom, individuals presumptively 
should have at least the rights to speak held by any mere instrumentally-
valued “entity”—such as the press. If the press is, as Justice Stewart 
suggested, the only constitutionally-protected business, its speech rights 
should only be greater, if at all, than those of other businesses. Even if, 
as Justice Stewart argues, the normative rationale for the two 
constitutional provisions is different, it is still possible—as I mostly 
argue—that both the press and individuals have basically the same right 
not to be censored. Censorship interferes both with individuals’ liberty 
and with the press’s performance of its instrumental role. The press 
might even have less, not more, speech rights if there are circumstances 
where the instrumental justification for its protection is not at stake—for 
example, if the regulation does not involve censorship. In contrast, the 
context where there may be special rights for the press as compared to 
individuals (as well as compared to other businesses) is where its 
institutional integrity is at stake. 
I and others have defended distinguishing the Speech and Press 
Clauses, usually understanding the Press Clause along the general lines 
of Justice Stewart’s Fourth Estate approach.19 Others reject this view, 
arguing that confusion and danger lie in giving the press any special 
                                                          
 18. Later, I consider the possibility that individuals have greater rights to be free from 
mandatory speech requirements and greater rights to be unrestricted by copyright than the press. See 
infra notes 38-62 and accompanying text. 
 19. In addition to the articles by Justices Stewart and Brennan, many in the communications 
field assume that the press is different and legal articles giving reasons for the conclusion are not 
uncommon. See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the 
Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 563-64 (1979); David A. Anderson, Freedom of the 
Press in Wartime, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 49, 66-69 (2006). I have presented my views various places. 
See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 225-71 (1989) [hereinafter 
BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH]; C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: 
Content-Based Regulation of Persons or Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 62 [hereinafter Baker, 
Turner Broadcasting]. I have also argued that Vincent Blasi’s argument for the checking function as 
being a central First Amendment value relies on historical evidence and rationales related to the 
Press Clause, not the First Amendment generally. Compare Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in 
First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 523 (arguing that free expression has 
value because of the function it performs in checking the abuse of official power and examining 
how this “checking value” differs from other values that have dominated First Amendment analysis) 
with C. Edwin Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 819, 830-31 (1980) [hereinafter Baker, Press Rights and Government Power]. 
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rights.20 The present Article is not intended to reenter this theoretical 
debate. Instead, this Article will challenge the common view that 
existing doctrine rejects the special rights or independent interpretation 
view. More specifically, the primary effort will be to: (i) consider the 
extent an independent interpretation of the Press Clause has been 
implicitly, though perhaps unwittingly, accepted by the courts. The 
argument will be that an independent interpretation either is implicit in 
decisions the Court has reached or provides a more appealing 
interpretation of good results that otherwise seem doctrinally anomalous. 
I will also consider: (ii) whether the independent interpretation would 
lead to the “better” and most likely resolution of issues that are currently 
doctrinally unresolved, that is, whether independent interpretation would 
be required. Finally, I will consider: (iii) whether it would provide 
correctives where good reasons exist for objecting to current doctrine. 
All the examples discussed below will fit into one of these three 
categories. 
There are two doctrinal contexts in which this exploration takes 
place. Part II considers how constitutional treatment of the press differs 
from that of individuals and obviously, the differences could involve 
either greater, lesser, or merely different protection. Part III involves 
how treatment of the press differs from that given to non-media 
commercial enterprises. Here, the expected differences, if any, will 
always be in the direction of greater protection of the press. Part IV will 
conclude with brief remarks on how definitional problems related to 
special treatment of the press are more apparent than real. 
II. DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
INDIVIDUALS AND THE PRESS 
Any differences between the Speech Clause and the Press Clause 
should depend on an understanding of the primary rationale behind each. 
This theoretical understanding could then provide a basis for predicting 
what differences should be found in an examination of doctrine if that 
doctrine corresponds to the proposed theory. Here, my hypothesis is that 
individual speech rights are based on respect for the individual’s 
autonomy or liberty as an actor. In contrast, the press’s rights are related 
to its instrumental role as a fundamental institution of a free and 
                                                          
 20. Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 609 
(1979); William W. Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a “Preferred Position”, 28 
HASTINGS L.J. 761, 768-69 (1977); David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 
77, 77 (1975). 
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democratic society. Most obviously this encompasses its Fourth Estate 
role, but more generally its role in developing and presenting 
information, opinion, and vision that is instrumentally valuable to its 
audience—the people in a free society. 
This understanding of the basis of the rights predicts corresponding 
doctrinal positions. As to speech, an individual should be free to say, 
and, at least whenever her basic values are at stake, not to say whatever 
she chooses. In contrast, the press should be able to communicate 
whatever it, as an independent entity, believes serves its audience’s need 
for facts, opinions, or vision. Thus, though for different reasons, the 
rationale for each clause requires freedom from censorship—that is, 
freedom from prohibitions or penalties for, in the case of the individual, 
expressive choices, and in the case of the press, its choices to 
communicate ideas or information. (This formulation does not exclude 
regulation of unprotected categories of speech, but the unprotected 
categories, whatever they are, should presumptively be the same for the 
individual and the press.) On the other hand, there may be differences. 
Most obviously, the individual should receive protection for her liberty 
and the press for its institutional integrity. Some regulations place one at 
issue but not the other. 
The most obvious example of only individual liberty being at issue 
is where the individual claims the liberty right not to bear false witness 
to her values. This constitutionally required respect for individual 
autonomy provides no obvious reason that the press should have such a 
right not to speak—at least, unless a mandate to speak can be shown in 
the particular context to be inconsistent with its integrity as an 
institution. So, though as to affirmative speech, the two should have 
(virtually) the same right to speak, the individual may have greater rights 
not to speak. In contrast, special rights of the press should be expected, if 
at all, in the context of laws or government practices that would interfere 
with its integrity as an institution. Just as the autonomy value has little 
applicability to an instrumentally-valued institution, institutional 
integrity has little application to the individual. Thus, any special rights 
related to institutional integrity of the press can be expected to have no 
parallel in claims that individuals can raise on their own. These, then, are 
the theoretical expectations. The rest of Part II examines the relative case 
law—and, I claim, largely confirms the review of the separate role of the 
two clauses. 
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A. Protecting Institutional Integrity: Special Press Rights 
1. Reporter’s Privilege 
The most discussed possibility, and one emphasized by Justice 
Stewart, is that journalists should have some privilege to refuse to 
identify confidential sources in judicial proceedings.21 The argument is 
that since, without wrong-doing by the press, the press develops this 
information about sources solely within the constitutionally-protected 
activity of providing news, and since compelled breaches of this 
confidentiality will significantly interfere with the press’s news-
providing role, that compelled breaches undermine its integrity as an 
institution. Moreover, the government has no legitimate authority to 
appropriate for itself the products of the press’s constitutionally-
protected freedom (i.e., its institutional integrity).22 Rather, the 
institutional integrity of the press can be seen to require that it be able to 
control its work product prior to publication.23 The emphasis here is 
specifically on institutional integrity. Justice Stewart’s complaint was 
that without this protection of journalists’ capacity to promise 
confidentiality, the authorities could “undermine the historic 
independence of the press by attempting to annex the journalistic 
profession as an investigative arm of government” to the long run 
detriment even of the administration of justice.24 The empirical claim is 
that the absence of this privilege will lead to the press being less able to 
provide quality news. The relevance of this instrumental point follows 
precisely from the basic claim that the Press Clause protects the 
institutional integrity of the press in order to benefit the public. 
Nevertheless, in Branzburg v. Hayes, speaking for the five member 
majority, Justice White stated that “[t]he sole issue before us is the 
                                                          
 21. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725-52 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 22. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 570-77 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 23. The 5-3 decision in Zurcher largely duplicated its split in the earlier Branzburg case. 
Justice White wrote for the five member majority including Justice Powell. Justice Powell, though, 
noted that in issuing a warrant a judge should interpret reasonableness in light of the value of the 
integrity of the press, id. at 570, a value which Justices Stewart and Marshall argued in dissent 
should prevent its issuance. Id. at 570-71. Even Justice White, though only arguing that judges 
should enforce the requirement of reasonableness for issuing warrants with special exactitude when 
the broader category of “First Amendment interests,” not specifically press interests, were at stake, 
observed “that the struggle from which the Fourth Amendment emerged ‘is largely a history of 
conflict between the Crown and the press.” He then gave as a consideration against adopting a 
general rule restricting warrants for certain searches of the press the fact, as he saw it, that recent 
history “hardly suggests abuse.” Id. at 564-66 (citation omitted). 
 24. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
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obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other 
citizens do . . . .”25 In response to the request to interpret the First 
Amendment as granting such a privilege, he said, “[t]his we decline to 
do.”26 Since this area of controversy is well known, I will only make a 
few brief comments. First, even taking Justice White’s opinion for all it 
is worth, it is singularly narrow. It did not assert the broader proposition 
that the Press Clause does not provide for special rights. As Justice 
Powell was quick to emphasize, Justice White allowed that “news 
gathering is not without its First Amendment protections.”27 The 
majority’s primary arguments were directed not at the commonly 
suggested view that freedom of the press does not provide for special 
rights.28 Rather, the opinion offered reasons to conclude that denial of a 
journalist privilege does not undermine freedom of the press and, 
according to Justice White, this fact is the lesson that history teaches.29 
With a history providing different empirical evidence—or a different 
reading of the history that we do have—Justice White did not rule out a 
different result. More specifically, the opinion limited itself to the 
narrow issue of whether the First Amendment provided this privilege, 
and in saying no, Justice White’s opinion said nothing about whether the 
Press Clause has independent significance in relation to other issues. 
Second, if one Justice had moved from Justice White’s majority to 
the dissenting view, the reigning doctrine would be that the Press Clause 
does provide different protection for the press than for individuals. 
Third, despite Justice White speaking for five Justices, many lower 
courts and commentators think that the case showed a different five 
Justices (a majority) supporting special constitutional claims of the 
press.30 That is, many lower courts read Justice Powell’s concurrence to 
require consideration of the needs of the press in a case-by-case 
determination of whether disclosure of a source is properly compelled, 
leading many lower federal courts—sometimes as a matter of federal 
common law but sometimes as a matter of the First Amendment—to 
                                                          
 25. Id. at 682 (majority opinion). 
 26. Id. at 690. 
 27. Id. at 707. 
 28. The majority did note that recognition of a journalist privilege would create the difficulty 
of determining “those categories of newsmen who qualified” as well as other practical problems, but 
this hardly seemed determinative. Id. at 704. The contexts in which this problem of identifying a 
person as a journalist arises—specifically, after the journalist’s investigation—may make this 
problem relatively easy to handle as compared to other contexts, such as a person wanting access to 
a facility on grounds that she may, as a freelancer, subsequently publish a story and thus should be 
considered part of the press. 
 29. Id. at 698-99. 
 30. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bowden, 838 A.2d 740, 752 (Pa. 2003). 
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provide protection and to formulate a test very close to the one that 
Justice Stewart had proposed.31 If these courts are right, this subsequent 
history can be read to show that Branzburg did in effect recognize an 
independent press right. 
In sum, nothing in Justice White’s opinion requires rejecting a view 
that the Press Clause has independent implications different from the 
Speech Clause and some elements suggest that it does. If Justice 
Powell’s opinion is read as many lower courts have read it, the majority 
in this case does base special press rights on the Press Clause. Finally, 
anyone who believes that a constitutional journalist privilege should 
exist is committed to reading the Press Clause as having independent 
force. Of course, she could also believe in the independent force of the 
Press Clause even if she favored total rejection of any constitutionally-
based reporter’s privilege. 
2. Required Speech: Mandatory Disclosure of Government 
Payment for Speech 
This Section deviates from the Article’s general approach by 
raising an important issue not yet litigated. Here I only claim that an 
independent interpretation of the Press Clause leads to the right result. 
Sometimes payment is made to get the payee to speak as the payor 
directs without the payee disclosing that she is not the originator, not the 
“author,” of the speech. This practice, paying another person or entity to 
present a communication as if it were their own, is what Ellen Goodman 
has described (and condemned) as “stealth marketing.”32 Functionally, 
“stealth” refers to the failure to identify speech as having been paid for, 
for example, not identifying the communication as an advertisement. 
                                                          
 31. MARK A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 575 (7th ed. 2005) (citing Anthony L. 
Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in States Without Shield Laws, 7 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 241, 252-53 n.74 (2002)), reports that by 2002 “all but one of the federal circuit 
courts of appeal appeared to recognize some form of qualified constitutional privilege.” The case 
book also noted opinions going the other way, id., and, according to Bruce Sanford, the judicial 
attitude may be quickly changing “with a velocity that would make your head spin faster than Linda 
Blair in the Exorcist.” Id. at 580. Of course, putting aside whether there is a First Amendment basis, 
many states rely on their own constitution, legislation, or state common law to find a privilege. For 
purposes of this essay, the main relevance of this fact may be that in the years after Branzburg a 
popular consensus (or sufficient lobbying power on the part of the press) seems to support a view 
that the press should be treated differently from individuals in this context, presumably because of 
the peculiar social role of the press. 
 32. Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83 (2006). 
See also Tamara R. Piety, “Merchants of Discontent”: An Exploration of the Psychology of 
Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377, 
444 (2001). 
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Many media entities are legally required to disclose the fact of 
payment (or, equivalently, identify the communication as an 
advertisement)—though cynically it might be asked how often these 
requirements have been enforced and how easy they are to circumvent. 
Since the 1912 “Postal Act,” newspapers and periodicals that receive 
second class mail privileges have been required to make this “mandated 
speech.”33 Congress has also imposed the same requirement on 
broadcasters and, in some cases, cable providers.34 There seems to be 
little question of the constitutionality of these requirements.35 Much less 
clear is whether disclosure can be required in cases where an individual, 
not a media entity or person working for a media entity, is paid to speak. 
The issue seldom arises, presumably because policy makers usually see 
no need for such a requirement in the case of individuals. Can, however, 
the government require political or charitable canvassers to identify 
themselves as either “paid” or “volunteer”? The Court has explicitly 
refused to decide the issue.36 Assuming, as seems likely, that mandated 
disclosure can be expected to reduce the effectiveness of the payee’s 
communication, the requirement would raise a difficult constitutional 
question.37 If the disclosure requirement were impermissible here, the 
                                                          
 33. 39 U.S.C. § 3685 (2000); Postal Service Appropriations Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-336, 
37 Stat. 539, 553-54 (1912). 
 34. See C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 371 n.155 
(1999). 
 35. For a good analysis, see Goodman, supra note 32, at 130-37. Although decided before any 
meaningful development of First Amendment doctrine, Lewis Publ’g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 
(1913), upheld the 1912 Postal Act against a First Amendment challenge. 229 U.S. 288, 313 (1913). 
 36. The Court has held that requiring paid, but not volunteer, circulators of ballot measure 
petitions to identify themselves by name and to communicate the amount they are paid to circulate 
the petitions is unconstitutional. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 204 
(1999). The Court repeatedly stated, however, that neither it nor the Court of Appeals expressed a 
view on whether the state could require that these canvassers identify their “paid or volunteer status, 
and if paid, by whom . . . .” Id. at 200; see also id. at 197. 
 37. Anonymity has been protected for varying instrumental reasons but primarily to aide 
vulnerable speakers. See Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 
HASTINGS L.J. 983, 1024-26 (2005). A speaker’s right to use paid stand-ins is well established. See, 
e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422-24 (1988); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 
487 U.S. 781, 803 (1988); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 
620, 633-34 (1980). Thus, a speaker can maintain anonymity and has a right to pay someone to 
stand in her place. The combination of these two rights could be seen to favor a right of non-
identification. Moreover, a regulation is of doubtful constitutional validity if designed to reduce a 
speaker’s effectiveness and only applies—only could constitutionally apply given the individual’s 
right to anonymous speech—when the payee avails herself of her constitutional right to use the 
stand-in. The requirement then would be punishing the exercise of a constitutional right. Still, to 
merely force the party to disclose that she is a stand-in may not interfere with why anonymity is 
protected. Existing precedent is not very informative maybe because the primary non-media 
contexts where mandated identification in support of increasing audience’s ability to assess 
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question then would be why the difference in the media and non-media 
contexts. I will not further speculate on how the Court would or should 
treat this open question. Rather, I turn to the issue of whether the First 
Amendment should ever be interpreted to mandate disclosure. 
Unidentified payment for speech is especially troubling when the 
government is the ultimate speaker. Having met any state action 
requirement, the question can then be raised: Does the Constitution 
prohibit stealth advocacy by the government? This view has been 
forcefully advanced. The argument is, essentially, that “political 
accountability [is] a bedrock principle of our Constitution” that grounds 
a constitutionally-based transparency principle for government 
communications.38 The government violates that principle when it 
speaks without identifying itself as the speaker. With this reasoning, Gia 
Lee finds a constitutional basis for mandating disclosure in the 
Constitution’s structural democratic commitments to public 
accountability.39 In the end, though, she concludes that this 
constitutionally-based transparency of government communications 
principle should play a role in constitutional litigation (for example, to 
bar the government from claiming that speech is its own if it had not 
disclosed that fact40) but, for practical reasons, violation of this 
constitutional principle should not itself create a cause of action. 
Even watered down so as not to create a cause of action for those 
harmed by violations, recognizing this principle would be a radical step. 
A plausible analogy would be First Amendment claims for a right of 
access to government-held information or to government facilities. The 
democratic benefits from access are clear—but lack of information never 
stops a person from speaking, including accusing the government of 
                                                          
messages have mostly occurred either in commercial contexts (where commercial speech is 
protected only or primarily to serve listeners’ interests) or in the campaign context, which, 
surprisingly to some, is probably the most regulated, and one of the most properly regulated, speech 
context. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
 38. Lee, supra note 37, at 1016. 
 39. Id. at 1016-17. 
 40. Lee effectively criticized Johanns, and her views were roughly expressed by the dissent. 
“[I]f government relies on the government-speech doctrine . . . it must make itself politically 
accountable by indicating that the content actually is a government message. . . .” Johanns v. 
Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 571 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). Still, Johanns may 
represent merely a sub-rosa rejection of United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 417 
(2001), which has been subject to savage critique for inconsistency with the bulk of Supreme Court 
law on commercial speech, see Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v 
Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195, and a return to upholding this type of 
assessment as the Court did earlier in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 477 
(1997). 
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“hiding” information that should be public, speculating about why it 
does so, and demanding that it come clean. Thus, how the denial of 
access violates speech freedom is unclear. Given the recognition that 
secrecy is sometimes desirable (whether to protect personal privacy or 
national security or many other legitimate interests), the better 
constitutional doctrine might be to treat the need for information not as 
giving rise to a constitutional right, but rather as providing a powerful 
argument for government (legislative or executive) action to make 
information available.41 The claim should be that legislatures should 
enact strong freedom of information acts, as they often have. 
Similarly, in the context of government speech, a host of arguably 
acceptable reasons explain why, and identify contexts in which, 
government might choose not to disclose that it is the ultimate source of 
a communication. Consider the use of undercover agents, promotion of 
views where the government only wants people to focus on the content, 
cases where, as is common in public relations-type promotions, an effort 
is made to identify the message with a personality popular among a 
targeted audience, and secretly authorized “leaks” of information. The 
propriety of these practices raise thorny policy issues, but it seems 
doubtful that constitutional analysis provides the right tools with which 
to resolve them. Thus, like in the relation between privacy and freedom 
of information acts, maybe the better approach is for the public to 
demand and for the legislature to enact general transparency rules, but to 
leave their extent up to legislative or other policy-making refinement. 
Curiously, in Lee’s argument for a constitutional basis for her 
“transparency of communications” principle, the main relevance of the 
First Amendment is as a potential obstacle.42 Mandated transparency 
seems initially to conflict with the First Amendment right of anonymity. 
In response, Lee persuasively argues that requiring government self-
identification does not conflict with any of the specific and limited 
reasons, all of which were only instrumental, for the First Amendment to 
                                                          
 41. This conclusion is not unassailable. Though in concurrence, Justice Brennan, who viewed 
the individual’s right to speak as virtually “inviolate,” adopted a dual level First Amendment 
approach that treats some instrumentally grounded claims, such as a right of access to information, 
as having First Amendment status and as justifying various “balancing” or pragmatic structural 
doctrines that sometimes provide a constitutional basis for access. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 585-86 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring). With this reasoning, 
Brennan went way beyond the majority’s more limited argument for why the judicial process is 
uniquely a place where people have a First Amendment right to be present to gather information.  
 42. Lee, supra note 37, at 1023-24.  
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protect anonymity.43 (She could have added the additional point that 
normally44 the First Amendment does not protect government speech.) 
Nevertheless, the First Amendment might bear more affirmatively 
on the issue Lee raised once media and individual speech are 
distinguished. The constitutional principle would then not be 
“transparency,” no matter how desirable that would be in general, but 
“required respect for institutional integrity,” which would be mandated 
as a core principle of the Press Clause. In the case of communications by 
individuals, it is difficult to see how the government violates that 
person’s First Amendment rights by employing her to present the 
government’s message even if the payment requires that she not identify 
herself as a government spokesperson. Are the First Amendment rights 
of a sports star violated when she is paid to say: “just say no!”? 
Sometimes terms of government employment that restrict her later 
speech may violate the First Amendment—but often not.45 The 
government permissibly restricts speech of an employee on the job if 
(and probably only if) the restriction advances her proper performance of 
her job and not disclosing in her communication that the government is 
                                                          
 43. Id. at 1020-21.  
 44. Whether the government, having created a particular government-owned institution, must 
recognize certain First Amendment rights of that institution is somewhat unsettled. For example, 
must the government respect First Amendment rights of public libraries? In United States v. 
American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003), Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion carefully 
avoided deciding this question, id. at 211-12, though Justice Stevens in dissent clearly found that it 
must. Id. at 226-27. Must the federal government respect First Amendment rights of local 
governmentally-created cable access channels? In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications 
Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996), the Court, in fractured opinions, found that the grant to 
cable operators of power to restrict certain offensive sexual programming on locally created public 
access channels violated the First Amendment, thereby implicitly finding that these public channels 
receive First Amendment protection. In concluding that a state-owned broadcast station did not 
violate candidate Forbes’s First Amendment rights to participate in a campaign debate, the Court’s 
reasoning assumed that, at least as then constituted, the state-owned broadcast stations had the same 
free speech rights that commercial stations had. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 
U.S. 666, 669 (1998). 
  The general argument for these conclusions is that when the government sets up an 
institution or funds a person to play a particular role, regulation of its or her speech contrary to the 
social role of the institution violates the First Amendment. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 
U.S. 533, 536-37 (2001). In a recent case involving the Stars and Stripes, a newspaper that has over 
280,000 readers and has considerable editorial independence, but is owned and published by the 
Department of Defense, the court, after accepting clear lower court precedent holding that a 
reporter’s privilege is established by the First Amendment, held that the paper’s journalists were 
entitled to the reporter’s First Amendment privilege, finding no reason to deny the privilege simply 
because the government owned and published the paper. Tripp v. Dep’t of Def., 284 F. Supp. 2d 50, 
57 (D.D.C. 2003).  
 45. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980). 
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the communication’s ultimate source can sometimes relate to that 
performance. 
The media context is different. Assume, as argued here, that the 
press receives constitutional protection to be a voice independent of the 
government (or, at least, independent of the other three “estates”) in 
order to perform the crucial democratic tasks of providing an 
independent source of vision and information, including performance of 
a watchdog role. Then the press’s claim to special constitutional 
protection encompasses most importantly a demand that the government 
not purposefully undermine its institutional integrity in its performance 
of these roles. Payment to the press to present the government’s message 
as the press’s own message (as opposed to payment for carriage as an 
advertisement) undermines this independence and breaches the press’s 
institutional integrity. The notion of a free press presumes that its speech 
represents its choices, not the government’s choices. Though the 
individual media entity presumably enters voluntarily into the agreement 
with the government not to identify the government as a payee, because 
the protection of the integrity of the press is for the benefit of the public, 
the government’s payment violates the public’s rights relating to a free 
press.46 
Even the media entity itself would object if the payment is to a 
media reporter or other employee who does not notify the media entity 
(i.e., its editor, publisher, or owner) that she has been paid by the 
government to have her story contain government-chosen content. In 
contrast, violation of institutional integrity does not occur if the 
communication is presented as that of the government, as it would if the 
content is explicitly identified as an advertisement. Likewise, the 
integrity of the press is not compromised, although its quality may be 
tested, when the government, through press releases or “leaks” or good 
public relations management or even lies, leads the press on the basis of 
the press’s own reporting or journalistic routines to print stories that the 
government wants reported. As Justice Stewart puts it, “[t]he 
Constitution . . . establishes the contest” in which “[t]he press is free to 
do battle”—and that contest includes an “autonomous press” as a 
                                                          
 46. In response to the practical question about “standing” to assert the violation, other non-
compromised media entities can complain that the practice damages them since it both undermines 
the reputation of the press on which they rely and creates competitive pressure on them to accept 
such payments. The 1912 postal legislation, which prohibited publication of paid speech without 
identifying it as advertising, was strongly supported by members of the press that did not engage in 
the practice. LINDA LAWSON, TRUTH IN PUBLISHING: FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE PRESS’S 
BUSINESS PRACTICES, 1880-1920 111 (1993). 
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constitutionally-protected participant.47 Essentially, this argument about 
a violation of institutional integrity takes the same form as did the 
argument for a reporter’s privilege (to not expose the identity of 
confidential sources), but is logically even stronger though less familiar. 
The public knows that the press may err, but if there is a “free press” that 
constitutes a watchdog on government, the public has a right to know 
that the decisions as to what the press prints under its own name are 
those of the watchdog and not the watched government. 
The objections to this use of the media lie most centrally in its 
destructive impact on democratic discourse.48 The general legal 
prohibition of “stealth” in periodicals and in broadcasting embodies the 
popular perception that the practice is objectionable.49 The law, 
however, has singled out governmental practices for special prohibitions. 
Typical appropriations legislation forbids government agencies from 
using government funds for “propaganda”50—a term of art given that 
many people reasonably view most of the government’s huge budgets 
for public relations, advocacy, and “informative” communications as 
being spent essentially on propaganda. As interpreted to mean “covert 
propaganda,” which involves “the concealment of [or failure to disclose] 
the agency’s role in sponsoring the materials,” these statutory 
requirements make the “stealth” interference with media integrity 
illegal.51 The dual goal is to restrict the government and to protect the 
integrity of the press.52 
Admittedly, the constitutional issue has not been decided and may 
not need to be decided given the (often ignored53) statutory prohibitions 
on governmental behavior. Still, the existing state of affairs represents a 
well-considered and quite explicit normative judgment about the nature 
of the press that a democracy should protect. Of course, the First 
                                                          
 47. Stewart, supra note 9, at 636. 
 48. Goodman, supra note 38, at 112-17. 
 49. Id. at 84.  
 50. Typical language is: “No part of any appropriation [contained in this or any other Act] 
shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes within the United States not heretofore 
authorized by the Congress.” See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, B-305368, Dep’t of Educ.—
Contract to Obtain Services of Armstrong Williams 6 (Sept. 30, 2005) [hereinafter GAO, B-
305368]. 
 51. Id. at 14-15 (citing U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, B-303495, Office of National Drug 
Control Policy—Video News Release (Jan 4, 2005)). Interpreting propaganda to mean covert 
propaganda, defined as communications “circulated as the ostensible position of parties outside the 
agency,” has been consistent. See id. at 7 (quoting U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, B-229257, 
Appropriations/Financial Management (June 10, 1988)). 
 52. See id. at 6.  
 53. Id. at 14-15.  
BAKER.P2A 9/15/2007 7:28:10 PM 
970 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:955 
Amendment directly restricts only government, not private corruption of 
a free press. The destructive impact on the integrity of the media has led 
to legislative prohibitions on private forms of contracting.54 The 
additional legislated limits on government agencies again represent a 
considered judgment about legitimate forms of public discourse. If 
presented with the issue, a court may, and I believe should, recognize the 
independent structural significance of the Press Clause, and find that 
government payments to the press to present the government’s position 
as the press’s own violates the public’s right to a free press. 
B. Protecting Individual Liberty 
1. Right Not to Speak: Speaking as Others Direct 
Possibly the doctrinal area in which an individual liberty theory of 
the First Amendment is most obviously in play is the right not to be 
coerced into making professions that one does not believe. In Barnette, 
the majority emphasized the foundation of the First Amendment in the 
liberty not to be coerced into pledging allegiance to the flag.55 In 
contrast, in dissent, Justice Frankfurter in effect adopted a marketplace 
of ideas theory, which is concerned that everything worth saying can be 
said. Frankfurter emphasized that he would join the majority if any 
speech or any view was suppressed.56 He observed, however, that both 
the children involved and their parents were entirely free to express their 
views, including their view about the horrendous nature of the 
compelled salute, both before and after the flag salute ceremony.57 Of 
                                                          
 54. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, div F, tit. VI 
§ 624, 118 Stat. 3, 356 (2004) (discussing the publicity and propaganda prohibition that prohibits 
the government from entering into certain contracts with private parties). 
 55. West Virgina Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 635-36 (1943). Though Barnette is 
used here to illustrate the claim, its holding has been repeated in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Wooley 
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713, 717 (1977). Closely related is the matter of freedom not to 
associate. Because it has complexities and, I believe, unresolved inconsistencies that are without 
any obvious parallels in the press context, I put it aside. 
 56. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 664 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 57.  
It is not even remotely suggested that the requirement for saluting the flag 
involves the slightest restriction against the fullest opportunity on the part both 
of the children and of their parents to disavow as publicly as they choose to do 
so the meaning that others attach to the gesture of salute. All channels of 
affirmative free expression are open to both children and parents. Had we 
before us any act of the state putting the slightest curbs upon such free 
expression, I should not lag behind any member of this Court in striking down 
such an invasion of the right to freedom of thought and freedom of speech 
protected by the Constitution. 
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course, like the instrumentalist marketplace theory of speech, the 
instrumentalist Fourth Estate view of the Press Clause places value 
primarily on things being said and speech not being censored. Both, 
among other things, treat the value in the guaranteed freedom as lying in 
its instrumental contribution to a search for truth or, more generally, in 
providing for the listener’s or audience’s need for exposure to diverse 
content. If this view of the Press Clause is adopted, the liberty not to 
speak protected for individuals in Barnette would have little 
applicability to the press.58 That turns out to be roughly the existing state 
of the law, a result inexplicable if the two clauses have a unified 
theoretical basis and scope. 
Compelled speech in many media contexts is quite routine. 
Broadcasters have both general and specific affirmative speech 
obligations. They either now have, or previously had, speech duties 
involving fairness, public service, reasonable access for political 
candidates, children-oriented educational content, and more.59 The 
primary current doctrinal question is whether these obligations can be 
cabined to the broadcast area on the basis of the view that broadcasting 
is a special case where First Amendment rights are less robust. Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo60 is regularly cited as representing the 
purportedly dominant print paradigm and as implying that compelled 
media speech would interfere with editorial autonomy.61 But when it 
came to upholding “must carry” cable requirements in Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Court emphatically did not place 
cable in a category with broadcasting or any other purportedly less 
protected category. Rather, rejecting the cable systems claim of 
interference with editorial autonomy, the Court emphasized that Miami 
Herald was a case about the impermissibility of punishing editorial 
                                                          
Id. at 664. 
 58. Of course, there might be other justifications specially related to the Press Clause for 
objecting to compelled media speech, an issue I put aside for now. 
 59. As is well known, the FCC found that the Fairness Doctrine was unconstitutional but the 
Court of Appeals affirmed purely on statutory grounds. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 
654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Particularly interesting, though speaking about the public interest not the 
constitutional issues, was Judge Wald’s opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. She 
agreed with the result concerning the deterrent or penalty aspects of the balance prong—an analysis 
which has since become the dominant interpretation of what was wrong with the right of reply in 
Miami Herald, but saw no “reasoned decisionmaking” supporting the elimination of the requirement 
to air issues of great public importance. Id. at 669-73. 
 60. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 61. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 813 (1996); 
Marvin Ammori, Another Worthy Tradition: How the Free Speech Curriculum Ignores Electronic 
Media and Distorts Free Speech Doctrine, 70 MO. L. REV. 59 (2005). 
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content choices.62 In other words, in the interpretation relied on in 
Turner Broadcasting, Miami Herald protected only against censorship, a 
result required by the press’s Fourth Estate role; it did not recognize any 
institutional autonomy or liberty analogous to that with which Barnette 
was concerned. 
2. Right Not to Speak: Anonymity 
Since the 1912 Postal Act referred to earlier, Congress has required 
newspapers and other periodicals having second class or periodical 
publication privileges to furnish the government and, at least once a 
year, to include in the publication the name of the editor, managing 
editor, publishers and owners as well as certain other information about 
circulation.63 That is, the statute purposely eliminates anonymity for 
much of the commercial press—in part out of a hope that the public will 
benefit from knowledge of the ownership, enabling them to resist 
manipulation.64 On the other hand, drawing on a history going back to 
the publicists for the American Revolution, the Court interprets the First 
Amendment to protect anonymity of individuals in many contexts—
especially in their distribution of pamphlets.65 There is certainly no 
simple distinction that individuals have anonymity rights and the press 
does not. Often individuals also do not. For example, the Court has 
upheld disclosure requirements for contributors in political 
campaigns66—although it also required that an exception be made when 
the requirement would predictably deter contributions to an unpopular 
political group, thereby undermining their speech.67 
The cases might be reconciled on the ground that there is no 
fundamental right of anonymity the way there may be for individual 
                                                          
 62. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 653-56 (1994). 
 63. 39 U.S.C. § 3685 (2000); Postal Service Appropriations Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-336, 
37 Stat. 539, 553-54 (1912). The Court in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan also upheld this 
requirement and it too is still on the books. 229 U.S. 288, 316 (1913). 
 64. Lewis Publ’g Co., 229 U.S. at 316. 
 65. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-43 (1995); Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960). 
 66. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976). But cf. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law 
Found., 525 U.S. 182, 200 (1999) (invalidating requirement that initiative petition circulators wear 
badge containing their name). 
 67. Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 95, 98 (1982). Cf. 
Geoffrey R. Stone & William P. Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers, Inequality as a Command of 
the First Amendment, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 583, 592 (describing the Court as mandating content 
discrimination). This result, however, follows easily from the perspective that the First Amendment 
primarily protects dissent. See generally STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE 
MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999). 
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speech—it is always a matter of pragmatic assessment. In many 
contexts, required disclosure can seriously deter speech. This deterrence 
of speech could then be seen as gratuitous, maybe even desired by the 
government, if the government could not give a convincing reason to 
require it.68 Thus, invalidation would depend on the likelihood of 
deterrence and the credibility of and necessity for the government’s 
rationale for requiring identification. 
The area, however, remains in tension. Disclosure of identity sheds 
light that can reduce manipulation of audiences, a possibly good 
purpose, but often this same light can deter speech. As for now, the right 
of anonymity has been recognized only in the context of individual 
speakers, not the press, thereby representing the difference that this 
Article is seeking. Nevertheless, the hypothesis here is that greater rights 
of the individual relate to claims of formal autonomy or liberty. Though 
the instrumentalist argument for anonymity is not inconsistent with such 
claims, it does not seem like the right type of difference to demonstrate 
the thesis offered here. I suspect that there is no fundamental distinction 
between the press and individual speech rights here. The Court gave as 
one of its reasons for invalidating the ban on anonymous handbills in 
Talley v. California, not only the importance of anonymity to individual 
pamphleteers in the revolutionary era, but also noting that the 
“obnoxious press licensing law of England . . . was due in part to the 
knowledge that exposure . . . would lessen the circulation of literature 
critical of the government.”69 
3. Restricting the Right to Speak: Copyright 
Like defamation law, copyright restricts speech absent permission 
from the protected party. Unlike defamation law, however, Fourth Estate 
press theory and individual liberty speech theory lead to different 
demands for limiting the copyright owners’ claims of control.70 Fourth 
Estate theory requires that the media be able to report all facts and 
ideas—which copyright’s idea/expression distinction largely grants. 
Expansive right for non-owners to use copyrighted material in 
transformative uses likely contributes more than it “costs” in terms of 
                                                          
 68. This would explain why the Court struck down mandated disclosure of membership lists 
in legislative investigations when the information was not germane to legitimate legislative 
purposes but upheld the disclosure requirement when it arguably seemed more relevant. 
 69. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64. In contrast, the dissent cited the press case, Lewis Publishing, as 
precedent for upholding the law. Id. at 70 (Clark J., dissenting). 
 70. See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 951 
(2002) [hereinafter Baker, First Amendment Limits]. 
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any reduced incentive to create originally. Giving some rights to 
copyright holders, however, arguably benefits the public by encouraging 
(commercial) creation. A media enterprise’s duplication of the full 
content of an item offered by a copyright holding competitor clearly 
amounts to a copyright violation.71 This restriction on publication, 
however, should hardly be troubling from a Fourth Estate perspective—
publication occurs, the public gets access. That is, properly constrained, 
copyright can support the press in its central role. As a practical matter, 
the institutional press is able to perform its Fourth Estate role only due to 
its ability to sell its product (or sell its audience to advertisers). The 
incentive provided by ownership to produce saleable products turns 
copyright into a purported “engine of free expression,”72 making it a 
plausible (though, of course, often controversial and not always 
persuasive) media policy aimed at expanding the quality (and, less 
importantly, maybe the quantity) of communications made available to 
the public.73 
Individuals’ speech freedom has no implications for freedom to 
profit from speech through market transactions. Market transactions 
involve exercises of power—each party to a transaction exercises power 
over the other by getting the other to do something she would not wish 
to do except for the fact of it leading to payment by the other.74 In 
contrast, outside of market exchanges, gains to a speaker typically result 
either due to her speech affirming or assisting in her own goals 
irrespective of an audience or due to her speech convincing an audience 
to share her perspective—creating a form of solidarity between speaker 
and listener. That is, free speech provides liberty and solidarity rights, 
not market rights. Thus, any bar copyright imposes on commercial uses 
of “other people’s expression” is not problematic from the perspective of 
individual speech freedom. It is otherwise, however, with limits on non-
commercial uses of copyrighted speech. Here, speech freedom demands 
a largely unrestricted opportunity to use other people’s words—a 
                                                          
 71. Publication of unpublished work, however, would seem to serve the press’s Fourth Estate 
role. A better ground for decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539 (1985), may have been an unfair competition (a “scoop”) theory, which is arguably consistent 
with a Fourth Estate or utilitarian perspective, than the theory offered by the Court, being 
unpublished, which in general might serve privacy interests but not public knowledge. See, e.g., 
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918). 
 72. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558. 
 73. This is the democratic justification for copyright consistently emphasized by Neil Netanel. 
See NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX: PROPERTY IN EXPRESSION/FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION (2007). 
 74. See C. Edwin Baker, Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 
U. PA. L. REV. 741, 769-71 (1986). 
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freedom implicit in early copyright legislation that only applied to 
commercial copying. The freedom to engage in non-commercial copying 
is still typically provided, as illustrated by individuals’ fair use right to 
engage in recording of broadcasts for purposes of time-shifting.75 
Expressive freedom for an individual must include her right to copy 
word for word and distribute a complete political analysis or to copy and 
give or to quote to her lover a complete poem if she finds those words 
better express her sensibilities than anything she herself has composed. 
As a matter of current copyright law, it seems clear that individuals 
have rights to non-commercial uses of copyrighted content not available 
to media entities.76 Other statutory limits on copyright, especially the 
inability to copyright facts and ideas, clearly provide well-established 
opportunities needed by media entities in order to properly perform their 
constitutional role.77 If the rights in both cases are constitutionally 
mandated, then this would be a case where different rationales for 
speech and for press freedom lead to different speech rights—with 
individual liberty providing more complete freedom than the limited 
usage rights required by media entities which are, themselves, often 
central beneficiaries of properly crafted copyright ownership rules.  
This constitutional conclusion, however, is uncertain. The Court 
has said that “[t]o the extent [copyright’s restrictions on a person making 
other people’s speeches] raise First Amendment concerns, copyright’s 
built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address them”; 
it concludes that no more First Amendment scrutiny is required as long 
as “Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright 
protection. . . .”78 A lot rides doctrinally, of course, on what “traditional 
contours” are taken to be. Here, however, my lament is somewhat 
different. Without identifying which of copyright’s built in safeguards 
are required by the First Amendment and which are merely a matter of 
legislative grace, it cannot be concluded with certainty whether or not 
the rights of individuals to use copyrighted materials in their (non-
commercial) expression and the usage rights also available to profit-
oriented media firms represent First Amendment minimums or policy 
judgments. Still, existing differences between rights for commercial 
media and the greater rights for individual non-commercial uses can be 
taken to represent popular judgments about the scope of different values 
                                                          
 75. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432-34 (1984). 
 76. Id. at 442.  
 77. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991). 
 78. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
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underlying commitments to both individual liberty and a Fourth Estate 
or, more broadly, a dynamic culture. 
4. Doctrinal Basics: Content Discrimination 
The presumptive impermissibility of content discrimination today 
constitutes a bedrock of First Amendment doctrine—or, maybe, of 
doctrinal confusion. This Section makes the following claim. The 
individual liberty concern of the Speech Clause and the democratic 
discourse concern that justifies special protection for the press suggest 
different objections to content discrimination. Given a presumption that 
when found it is bad, the different objections lead to different methods 
of identifying content discrimination. While this would not be 
problematic if the Court was clear about when to use one or the other 
conception of content discrimination, its failure to explain these different 
bases of objection has contributed to confusion in this area. Still, case 
law results (largely) correspond to what a dual Speech/Press Clause 
perspective suggests. 
The modern doctrine condemning content discrimination is 
normally taken to have been initiated by the 1972 decision of Police 
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, where Chicago had prohibited 
picketing within 150 feet of a school while the school was in session 
except for “‘peaceful [labor] picketing of any school involved in a labor 
dispute . . . .’”79 In invalidating this ordinance, the Court made three 
arguments (as well as relying on two constitutional provisions—the First 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, although later cases have 
made clear that the First Amendment itself encompasses all that is 
important in the equal protection argument and I will not attempt to 
separate the elements). First is a neutrality argument. The Court 
explained, “the ordinance itself describes impermissible picketing . . . in 
terms of subject matter. The regulation ‘thus slip[s] from the neutrality 
of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about content.’ This is 
never permitted.”80 Second is an objection to restriction of speech on the 
basis of content, which leaves open the possible permissibility of 
promotion on the basis of content. The Court said, “the First 
                                                          
 79. Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 93 (1972). The application of the 
exemption only to labor picketing, as indicated by my brackets, was undisputed. Id. at 94 n.2. 
 80. Id. at 99 (citation omitted). Neutrality is also suggested by the Court’s statement that the 
government “may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There 
is an ‘equality of status in the field of ideas,’ and government must afford all points of view an 
equal opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 96 (citation omitted). Cf. City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. 
Wisconsin Pub. Emply. Relat. Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (allowing such selection). 
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Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression 
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”81 It 
further explained, the “government may not grant the use of a forum to 
people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to 
express less favored or more controversial views.”82 Third is a defense 
of people’s speech freedom on the grounds that permitting labor speech 
shows that a bar on a person’s speech is not really required by the state’s 
purpose in its use of this property. The theory is that gratuitous 
restrictions on speech are unconstitutional.83 Thus, the Court says:  
Although preventing school disruption is a city’s legitimate concern, 
Chicago itself has determined that peaceful labor picketing during 
school hours is not an undue interference with school. 
Therefore, . . . Chicago may not maintain that other picketing disrupts 
the school unless that picketing is clearly more disruptive than the 
picketing Chicago already permits. If peaceful labor picketing is 
permitted, there is no justification for prohibiting all nonlabor 
picketing, both peaceful and nonpeaceful. “Peaceful” nonlabor 
picketing, however the term “peaceful” is defined, is obviously no 
more disruptive than “peaceful” labor picketing. But Chicago’s 
ordinance permits the latter and prohibits the former.84 
Thus, the Court offered three different rationales for objecting to content 
discrimination involving, respectively, principles of neutrality, non-
suppression, and speech freedom. Some observations can be made about 
each. 
“Neutrality” has some intuitive appeal but, at least as normally 
understood, is entirely inconsistent with accepted practice. Periodically, 
the First Amendment is asserted to require government neutrality in the 
marketplace of ideas.85 Such a view, however, would invalidate the 
accepted and hugely active role of government in engaging in speech, 
                                                          
 81. Id. at 95. Along the same lines, the Court argued that “[a]ny restriction on expressive 
activity because of its content would completely undercut the ‘profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’” Id. at 96 
(quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)) (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. at 96. 
 83. Id. at 100. 
 84. Id. (citations omitted). This is the argument that the Court, in one of the deletions above, 
treats as an equal protection problem and later notes that such disruption can be handled by a more 
“narrowly tailored” or “narrowly drawn” statute. Id. at 101, 102. Interestingly, though citing equal 
protection cases for the narrowly tailored standard, all the other cases cited to illustrate why the law 
failed this constitutional standard were First Amendment cases. See id. at 101 n.8; Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 
(1968); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948). 
 85. Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 566-67 (1980).  
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usually to promote the government’s views.86 Topics and views that the 
government expresses directly or promotes using others’ speech have 
more than an equal status in the field of ideas and more than an equal 
opportunity to be heard. If “neutrality” refers to a constitutionally-
required governmental stance toward the marketplace of ideas, the 
notion cannot be taken seriously as an aspect of constitutional doctrine. 
(There is also no available conception of a proper baseline of non-
governmentally structured discourse from which to identify deviations 
from neutrality.) 
A constitutional objection to government restrictions on, as 
opposed to objections to the promotion of, particular content or 
particular subject matters is more persuasive. Of course, any notion that 
suppression (treated as unacceptable) differs from promotion (treated as 
acceptable) also requires a baseline. This baseline, however, can be 
found through an examination of the purpose or interpretative meaning 
of the law—and the vitality of this “purpose” inquiry is well 
established.87 Objection to suppression makes sense from a marketplace 
of ideas or a Fourth Estate perspective. Although there may be no 
standards for a neutral or properly working marketplace, and 
consequently no objection to any content that is added even when added 
and promoted by the government, preventing content from entering 
contradicts the fundamental notion of a free marketplace of ideas. 
Restrictions of particular content is, at least in many contexts, 
“censorship in its most odious form,” according to Justice Black as 
quoted by the majority in Mosley.88 In addition, suppression, at least as 
applied to individual speakers, is also objectionable as unjustified 
interferences with their liberty. Essentially, the claim here is that the key 
value of liberalism should be toleration, not neutrality—and suppression, 
restriction of speech out of objection to its content, is the opposite of 
toleration. Thus, restrictions as a means to suppress certain content, 
whether of particular subject matters or viewpoints, should be equally 
unconstitutional under either an individual liberty speech theory or a 
Fourth Estate press theory. 
                                                          
 86. See id. at 568; MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND 
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983); EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, 
MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 2 (1988). 
 87. See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP 
MATTERS 138-41 (2007). Possibly the dominant reasons to ignore this feature of doctrine reflects, 
for conservatives, a tendency to adopt economic models and, for liberals, a tendency to be effects or 
outcome oriented. 
 88. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98 (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., 
concurring)). 
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The problem with this objection is that it does not fit the facts of 
Mosley. It is very difficult to believe that Chicago wished to suppress 
discussion of all issues except those involving labor disputes. The 
exemption of picketing about labor disputes is much better explained by 
the lobbying power of teachers’ unions—they wanted to promote or 
enable their speech—than by any animosity to all other categories of 
speech. Surely, Chicago had no animosity to expression promoting the 
re-election of the mayor, even though the law restricted that expression. 
Thus, objections to suppression can hardly explain what is significant in 
the constantly cited case of Mosley. 
The speech freedom principle provides the most interesting 
objection to content discrimination. As a matter of individual liberty, 
there should be a presumption that a person can engage in her chosen 
expressive activity whenever she chooses—certainly, should generally 
be able to do so at least in places that she otherwise has a right to be. The 
Court has held that the streets and parks are such places.89 Still, despite a 
person’s general right to be at some place, regulation is sometimes 
justified if her activities, as activities, would interfere with other uses to 
which the government wishes to dedicate the property, other uses that 
the government considers especially valuable. Given the potential 
legitimacy of such governmental choices to make use of public property 
to pursue public goals, the fear is that these reasons will constantly be 
available to override speech freedom.90 A practical response is to 
develop evidentiary doctrines that identify when limits on liberty are 
best explained by lack of respect for expressive liberty rather than by 
real needs for the use of the property at issue. Permissible, then, would 
be regulations reasonably necessary given these government-dedicated 
uses.91 Impermissible would be a regulation not necessary to serve the 
government interest—for example, a limit on leafleting, where the real 
evil is not leafleting but littering. There the government could (even if 
predictably less efficiently) simply prohibit littering—the real evil—
rather than prohibit leafleting, that is, the speech.92 
A parallel conclusion—that the government does not really believe 
its regulation is essential for serving the government needs in respect to 
the property—presumptively follows if the denial of freedom depends 
                                                          
 89. See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). In modern 
language, these are traditional public forums. 
 90. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98-99. 
 91. This approach interprets scrutiny tests as an aide to interpretation rather than a matter of 
instrumental rationality. 
 92. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939). 
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on the content of the expression. The evidentiary question, as the Court 
in Mosley noted, is whether the disallowed speech really interferes with 
the government’s normal use of the property more than does the allowed 
speech.93 The rationale of asking this question is not to identify a proper 
functioning of the marketplace of ideas or to prevent censorship. The 
specific point is to protect the individual liberty that the regulation 
would restrict. Thus, the central feature of the only coherent argument 
that fits the facts of Mosley is that content discrimination is often bad 
because it evidences an unnecessary restriction on individual expressive 
freedom. The objection exists even without a suppressive aim. No 
censorious purpose or danger need be shown. 
Though the above is the only objection that fits the facts in Mosley, 
two points should be made about the second and third objections to 
content discrimination, the two that were found to be coherent. First, the 
speech freedom argument is most obviously relevant to individuals—
that is, it is a Speech Clause claim. This is illustrated by its “official” 
origin in Mosley and the common interpretation of the prohibition on 
content discrimination as an offshoot of time, place, and manner 
doctrine.94 Because the requirement relates to limits on people’s use of 
government property, it has no obvious application to issues of media 
policy or regulation even if these policies are content-based. In contrast, 
the narrower concern with suppression is relevant in both contexts—that 
of press regulation and individual freedom. Media policies that suppress, 
as opposed to promote, speech on the basis of content, that is, policies 
that engage in censorship, should be invalidated. 
This doctrinal distinction is fortunate. History provides a long line 
of socially desirable governmental attempts to promote quality media 
content.95 Promotion of national news, local news, the arts, and 
educational content for children is constitutionally unobjectionable 
despite their content basis. In contrast, true attempts to suppress 
particular content, subjects, or viewpoints are objectionable as 
censorship. Purposeful suppression interferes both with the press’s role 
in a democratic society and with individual autonomy. But by making 
                                                          
 93. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100. 
 94. Even if identified with Mosley, the objection to content discrimination has a longer 
history. It is implicit in the long recognized reasons to reject standardless permit systems—namely, 
that they allow “censorship in its baldest form.” Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). 
Again, though not clearly articulated as an objection to content discrimination, the point was 
generally well recognized before Mosley. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 303-04, 371-73 (1970) (public spaces must be made available to all on an equal basis; 
permit systems must be limited by standards sufficient to prevent uncontrollable authority).  
 95. See Baker, Turner Broadcasting, supra note 19, at 111. 
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the “evidence of lack of necessity” argument in Mosley, the Court 
implicitly adopted the liberty theory with respect to individual speakers 
and implicitly recognized special implications of the Speech Clause.96 
Second, the two objections naturally suggest different criteria for 
identifying (presumptively objectionable) content discrimination. The 
concern with unnecessary restraints on individual expressive liberty is 
possibly best embodied in the test for content discrimination offered by 
Justice Brennan: “[A]ny restriction on speech, the application of which 
turns on the content of the speech, is a content-based restriction 
regardless of the motivation that lies behind it.”97 That is, any time a law 
applier must examine the content of the speech in order to determine the 
applicability of a regulation, content discrimination exists. On the other 
hand, the concern with suppression would suggest an alternative test: 
“The principal inquiry in determining content-neutrality . . . is whether 
the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of 
disagreement with the message it conveys.”98 
These two points add up to a third. The narrower test, “because of 
disagreement with the message,” should always provide a basis to 
invalidate a law except where the government is in some sense the 
speaker. In particular, suppression—or regulation because of 
disagreement with the message—is equally objectionable under the 
Press Clause and Speech Clause analyses. Passing this test, however, 
should not end the inquiry when individual speech freedom is at stake. 
Then, the other test, “turns on the content of the speech,” should also 
apply. Unfortunately, I cannot show that this is how the tests have been 
invoked. My sense is that the Court exhibits doctrinal confusion in its 
                                                          
 96. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 97-98. 
 97. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335-36 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring). Similarly, in 
finding that a ban on editorializing by noncommercial broadcast stations was a content regulation, 
Justice Brennan explained that to determine “whether a particular statement by station management 
constitutes an ‘editorial’, . . . enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the content of the 
message.” FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984). 
 98. This test has had a checkered life. It was originally formulated in Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), where the test was designed only to determine whether a facially 
content-neutral law should be found to be actually content-based. In that context, namely where the 
challenged law is not content-based on its face, the test makes perfect sense. The test has been used 
in about ten cases since, almost always in upholding a law after finding it not to be content-based. 
Interestingly, the Court in Turner quoted the Ward test but transformed it by adding in brackets 
around the words “agreement or” before the word “disagreement”—which makes the test seem to 
require neutrality, not merely suppression. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 
(1994). Given that change, the dissent makes a persuasive argument that the must-carry law there 
was content-based. If, however, the proper test in the media context is, as I have argued, the 
suppression version of the test, the majority reached the right conclusion. See Baker, Turner 
Broadcasting, supra note 19, at 127-28. 
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oscillation between the two.99 Nevertheless, Court results seem largely in 
line with what would be called for by an honest application of these tests 
in the manner recommended here. For example, the government’s 
legitimate aim with its must-carry rules, upheld in Turner 
Broadcasting,100 was not to suppress content, but to promote the 
availability of local content, especially local news and cultural or current 
affairs programming. Likewise, although violations of copyright 
obviously turn on examining the content of the infringing speech to see 
if it duplicates copyrighted expression, the legitimate goal of copyright 
as a media policy regulation is to promote, not suppress, production of 
quality speech. Often, maybe usually, this legitimate purpose should 
suffice to defeat challenges by commercial copiers. In contrast, the 
Speech Clause analysis mandates legal permission for most non-
commercial copying. Here, the content regulation—the regulation 
requires examination and comparisons of content—unnecessarily 
interferes with individual liberty.101 
C. Summary 
Even if the Speech and the Press Clauses have different rationales 
and protect different types of agents, their rationales overlap in objecting 
to any government censorship. Hence, in respect to most core First 
Amendment issues, the same result follows whether the case involves an 
individual or the press. Bread and butter First Amendment cases, those 
involving run of the mill censorship, can be explained on either basis. 
Censorship equally infringes individual liberty and interferes with the 
constitutional role of the press—as well as violating any other First 
Amendment theory that has any judicial traction. Such cases do not test 
whether the Press Clause has an independent status. 
                                                          
 99. In addition to this oscillation, members of the Court vary greatly in their attitude about the 
notion of content discrimination. Justice Kennedy, for example, argues that content discrimination 
should be per se unconstitutional, with no need to additionally flunk the traditional equal protection 
strict scrutiny test, while Justice Stevens frequently criticizes routine invocation of the doctrine. See, 
e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 65-66 (1976). Moreover, all members of 
the Court agree that the doctrine applies differently in different contexts—e.g., depending on the 
type of forum at issue. In fact, all members agree that even the most extreme version of content 
discrimination, namely viewpoint discrimination, is sometimes justifiable without any scrutiny, for 
example, if the context is “not a forum at all” such as the day-to-day programming of a public 
broadcaster. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998). 
 100. 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
 101. For a further discussion of First Amendment implications on copyright laws, see Baker, 
First Amendment Limits, supra note 70, at 922-40. 
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Part II has shown that, where the hypothesis of a separate meaning 
of the two clauses would have relevance, actual case law either 
corresponds to the separate meaning hypothesis or is open, but in the 
later circumstance is most appealingly advanced by the separate 
meaning theory. Individual liberty is infringed if the government 
compels individuals to speak someone else’s, for example, the 
government’s chosen words, so the Court has protected these 
individuals. In contrast, requiring the media to carry information and 
sometimes even ideologically charged speech that the media entity 
would reject often interferes with neither a marketplace of ideas nor the 
capacity of the media to serve the public and its Fourth Estate role—in 
fact, it may promote these ends. These laws have always been upheld. 
Anonymity has also been instrumentally much more important to the 
communicative freedom of individuals than of media businesses, and 
that is where it has (sometimes) been protected. Individual liberty 
suggests a right to say anything one chooses even if one chooses to use 
expressions originally spoken or written by another person. In contrast, 
the instrumental justification of a free press is usually satisfied if the 
media is able to duplicate the facts or ideas that another person or entity 
has previously created.102 Though not perfectly, copyright law largely 
corresponds to this distinction, explicitly leaving open whether the First 
Amendment compels these differing protections of the expression of, 
respectively, the individual and the press. Finally, clarity would be 
brought to the plastic and inconsistently formulated doctrinal objection 
to content discrimination if it were understood that one formulation 
primarily relates to protecting individual liberty and should be in play 
only when this liberty is the issue, while a more limited conception of 
content suppression should apply more broadly to protect audience as 
well as speaker interests, including audience interests related to the 
constitutional role of the media. 
The key addition that a separate interpretation of the Press Clause 
offers the press involves its institutional integrity. A proposed 
interpretation of case law in relation to the validity of the thesis of 
protection of institutional integrity must face a potential indeterminacy. 
A failure to recognize a particular claim can be interpreted either as a 
conclusion that the First Amendment does not give special protection to 
the press’s integrity or that its integrity is not threatened by rejecting the 
                                                          
 102. Complications occur for the news media where the actual words (or pictures) constitute 
the news or for the creative media where the project requires the integration of former expression—
issues potentially handled by fair use doctrines including the notion of news use and transformative 
uses. 
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claim.103 Certainly, nowhere has the institutional integrity argument been 
clearly rejected,104 with the law being apparently unsettled in the two 
contexts considered. Justice Powell’s concurrence in Branzburg allowed 
many, probably most, lower courts faced with the issue to conclude that 
the First Amendment does justify at least some special attention to the 
press’s claims not to be required to reveal confidential sources.105 The 
view that this represents the proper understanding of the First 
Amendment has also clearly prevailed among journalists and arguably 
within popular opinion. The right to have the government not subvert the 
integrity of the press by the government paying the media to present the 
government’s views as its own has not been presented to the courts. 
Legislative decisions to prohibit private parties from making such 
payments and media entities from accepting them, prohibitions on 
government that have been interpreted to bar primarily these “covert” 
payments, and popular outrage at such practices when exposed illustrate 
the popular view that this type of payment undermines a fundamental 
value of institutional integrity. 
In sum, the independent interpretation of the two clauses is clearly 
evident in constitutional holdings respecting autonomy rights of 
individuals not granted to media entities and arguably in existing (and 
desirable) doctrine relating to special rights of media to protection of 
their institutional integrity.  
                                                          
 103. Although Chief Justice Burger’s later concurrence in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 797-802 (1978), was obviously hostile to any reading of Branzburg as recognizing a 
separate meaning for the Press Clause, Justice White’s original opinion for the Court can be read as 
merely doubting that a reporter’s privilege was needed to maintain institutional integrity and the 
press’s ability to perform its role, leaving open what he would say in other cases. Thus, it is less 
clear what Justice White would say about payment to the press to present the government’s views as 
the press’s own or government power to license the press, compared to government’s clear power to 
license other speaking occupations. Cf. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 214-15 (1985) (White, J., 
concurring).  
 104. Cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978) (rejecting newspapers special 
rights in relation to being subject to search warrants). Zurcher may well fall into the category of not 
being essential for institutional integrity. Certainly, the thrust of Justice White’s opinion for the 
Court was to show that the press needed no such protection. 
 105. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998); Titan Sports, Inc. v. 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1998); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292-93 
(9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Long, 978 F.2d 850, 852-53 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988). But see McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 
530, 532-33 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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III. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE PRESS 
AND OTHER BUSINESSES 
Business entities are constituted by legal recognition of the 
significance of acts taken by individuals. Thus, ultimately, the moving 
parts are individuals. If there were no independent interpretation of the 
Press Clause, two possibilities would exist. The individuals, by being the 
actual authors of their business’s speech, would be fully protected by the 
First Amendment, just like in respect to their other speech. Or, given that 
businesses are necessarily structured by law and subject to extensive and 
constitutionally unquestionable regulation, speech attributable to the 
business enterprise—itself a legal creation106—would be generally 
subject to regulation. On either view, without recognition of an 
independent interpretation of the Press Clause, the press would have no 
rights different from that of any other commercial or market-oriented 
endeavors. A business’s speech (or its expenditures on speech) would be 
equally protected as ultimately that of an individual or equally subject to 
regulation as that of a business no matter what the business is. 
Though either protecting or not protecting the speech of all 
business represents a coherent possibility, from the perspective of 
individual liberty, a corporation’s potentially “immense aggregations of 
wealth . . . have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas”—that is, its speech—while contributions 
of actual flesh and blood individuals to segregated funds do “accurately 
reflect[] contributors’ support . . . . ”107 More generally, “the 
communications of profitmaking corporations . . . do not represent a 
manifestation of individual freedom or choice.”108 This conclusion 
presumably follows for both media and non-media business enterprises. 
In fact, in relation to typical examples of a corporation’s speech, it may 
be more likely that more stockholders of General Motors will expect, 
maybe even desire, its speech, for example, about the merits of its cars, 
than the stockholders of a media conglomerate will desire its speech, for 
example, its Presidential endorsement. If there are instead greater speech 
                                                          
 106. Tax law, corporate and partnership law, and a host of regulatory law distinguish people 
acting as business entities or entrepreneurs from people on their own. 
 107. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
 108. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 805 (White, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Justice White then 
immediately distinguished some corporations organized for the express purpose of advancing 
ideological ideas and the press as cases where the corporation “may be viewed as merely a means of 
achieving effective self-expression.” Id. This argument clearly applies to the ideological 
corporation, but the fact that the press is created, according to Justice White, to “disseminat[e] 
information and ideas” does not show why it should be viewed as a means of “self-expression.” Id. 
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rights for the newspaper than the car company, it would seem that the 
right must lie not in protection of individual liberty (the Speech Clause), 
but in some independent status of the press (embodied in the Press 
Clause). 
Thus, only if an independent status is given to the press by the 
Press Clause would the speech and other rights of the media be different 
from, in particular, greater than, those of other businesses—except 
maybe due to legislative grace.109 Correspondingly, a test of the thesis 
that the Court has implicitly recognized an independent interpretation of 
the Press Clause is to see if it recognizes—or, maybe to consider if it 
almost certainly would recognize—different First Amendment rights of 
media and non-media enterprises. 
This examination (conducted below) shows that there is no 
equivalence between the media and other business entities’ legal rights. 
Most of the divergences are precisely those expected if the First 
Amendment protects the press as a provider of communicative content 
for an open democratic culture and all of the divergences are consistent 
with this thesis. Still, methodologically, there is a difficulty. Legislative 
decisions create most of these differences in rights. In all these cases, 
sound democratic policy reasons, independent of any constitutional 
mandate, may provide the basis for the differences. Whether the laws 
embodying the differences reflect merely policy or whether they also 
reflect legislators’ implicit (and correct) judgments about their 
constitutional obligation to not violate press freedom cannot be 
determined analytically—and probably most legislators would not be 
conscious of the distinction. Still, sometimes this opaqueness is not 
present and, in other situations, reasonable conclusions can be made 
about constitutional mandates. Thus, in looking at various different 
treatments of the press and other businesses, Part III offers one or the 
other of three types of arguments depending on the example. In some 
cases, court decisions implicitly recognize the independent significance 
of the Press Clause by reaching constitutional holdings that, on grounds 
of consistency, cannot be understood other than as embodying an 
                                                          
 109. Businesses are routinely subject to industry-specific regulation and sometimes industry-
specific privileges. That this is true for the press might initially suggest equal protection 
challenges—but when made, these challenges should, and have, lost. For example, in FCC v. 
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, newspapers were distinguished from non-media 
corporations in being disabled from receiving broadcast licenses in their area of operation. Their 
equal protection challenge was noted, but rejected without discussion. 436 U.S. 775, 801-02 (1978). 
More generally, equal protection objections to industry specific regulation would suggest the 
potential unconstitutionality of the FCC as well as the Newspaper Preservation Act and much other 
legislation. 
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independent interpretation of the Press Clause. In other cases, reading 
the Constitution as embodying an independent meaning of the Press 
Clause provides a more satisfying basis for an intuitively right result that 
the Court reached in a confused way. Finally, often examples merely 
point to differences in legal rights that have been legislatively adopted 
but would only be constitutionally required if the Press Clause has 
independent significance. In many of these later cases, however, I 
suggest that most people would not want to accept and, in fact, the Court 
predictably would not accept a legislative failure to give the press the 
rights provided by existing law. Obviously, the first of these arguments 
provides the strongest evidence for the thesis of this Article that existing 
law embodies an independent interpretation of the Press Clause. The last 
two provide a strong incentive to adopt this view and a reasonable basis 
to predict that the Court would adopt it in the face of legislative failure. 
Although the categorization is crude, I try to organize the examples 
around different contexts or types of issues. 
A. Media Speech Rights 
1. Informational Privacy 
Since Warren and Brandeis’s classic article, The Right to Privacy, 
published in 1890,110 the twentieth century has seen a huge growth in 
this area of law (a matter itself calling for sociological explanation), with 
protection of informational privacy being a fertile basis of statutory and 
judicial decision-making. Law school case books are written and 
conferences regularly held on how far this right should extend and what 
the best ways to protect it are. Many people simply do not want various 
facts about themselves exposed at all—or, if at all, only when they 
themselves make the exposure and maintain power to control subsequent 
uses of the information. The question here is whether the extent the law 
is constitutionally permitted to protect this interest varies depending on 
whether the protection is against press exposure or against other 
commercial, but still communicative,111 uses. In every case decided so 
                                                          
 110. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 111. Sometimes, rather than prevent the flow of information the law adopts the strategy of 
denying businesses the right to make use of the information in their decision-making. For example, 
some laws prohibit businesses from basing hiring, selling, or other commercial decisions on the 
race, gender, sexual orientation, religion or other categorical aspects of individuals even though it 
allows them to possess this information. This restriction does not directly relate to the flow of the 
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far by the Supreme Court, it has struck down attempts to protect 
individual privacy from truthful media exposure,112 while (as far as I 
know) never finding unconstitutional legislative attempts to protect this 
privacy against intrusion by other businesses (or by the government). 
Thus, despite the huge and popular development of this “right,” it 
remains possible to argue that the Supreme Court would not and should 
not uphold any restriction on media exposure. Pragmatically, this 
distinction may reflect that non-media businesses and government are 
the source of the more common intrusions that matter to most people. In 
any event, the law at present clearly embodies greater protection here of 
the speech rights of the media than of other businesses. 
Doctrine in this area is still developing. Some, but decidedly not all, 
states presumably make it a tort to expose certain private information 
about a person.113 Nevertheless, the category of private information 
protected by general tort law that applies to the media is usually very, 
maybe even vanishingly, narrow. For example, it usually covers only 
information that is both “not of legitimate concern to the public” and 
also is of a type whose disclosure “would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.”114 Cases where states have in fact recognized the 
tort, especially as applied to the media, have been rare and the tort has 
been subject to severe judicial and scholarly criticism.115  
So far, the Supreme Court has only examined restrictions on 
communication of private information in media cases where statutes 
specifically restricted communication of discrete categories of 
information—for example, the name of rape victims, juvenile 
defendants, or information about confidential proceedings before a 
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission investigating alleged improper 
behavior by a judge.116 In every decision, the Court has upheld the 
                                                          
information, though gathering information about these qualities can sometimes be evidence of intent 
to make improper use of it. 
 112. Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 176. 
 113. Among the states, Oregon and New York have rejected the tort. See Anderson v. Fisher 
Broad. Cos., 712 P.2d 803, 814 (Or. 1986) (a carefully reasoned opinion by Hans Linde that paid 
great attention to free speech considerations); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 
447 (N.Y. 1902). 
 114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976); see also Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 115. See, e.g., Anderson, 712 P.2d at 808; Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: 
A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 296-99 (1983); see 
also C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The Central Meaning of the 
First Amendment, 21 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 215 (2004). 
 116. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g 
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98-100 (1979); Landmark Commc’ns v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837-38 (1978). 
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media’s constitutional objections and protected their speech.117 In every 
case, however, the Court cautiously wrote its opinion very narrowly—
explicitly leaving open the possibility of upholding prohibitions on 
media exposure of private information in an appropriate case.118 Still, the 
First Amendment clearly protects most, if not all, communication of 
“private” information by the media. 
The situation changes when the legal regulation of the practices of 
other commercial entities is examined. They are subject to considerable 
regulation in their disclosure of personal information about 
individuals.119 Probably the area of greatest societal concern has been 
information kept in databases, medical records, and credit reports. As a 
central example, consider credit reporting agencies—that is, private 
businesses engaged in providing personal consumer credit or related 
information to third parties.120 Their communications are regulated in 
ways that clearly could not be imposed on newspapers or other mass 
media. For example, credit reporting agencies can only supply reports to 
certain persons—that is, the law limits the people to whom they can 
speak!121 They cannot include certain information, for example, about a 
bankruptcy that occurred over ten years before the report or about many 
other adverse events that occurred over seven years earlier.122 In many 
cases—for example, if the report will be used in connection with an 
employment decision or in some cases when the information relates to 
medical records, the credit reporting agency can provide the information 
only with the consent of the person about whom it is speaking.123 
                                                          
 117. See, e.g., Smith, 443 U.S. at 106. 
 118. See, e.g., id. 
 119. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for 
Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195 (1992). 
 120. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2000) (defining consumer reporting agencies). Other commercial 
enterprises are similarly prohibited from disclosing information that the press or media could not be 
stopped from disclosing, at least, could not be in respect to their constitutional roles of 
communicating information to the public. For example, the Family Education Rights and Privacy 
Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g (b) (1) (2002), prohibits schools that receive federal money from 
releasing various information about a student—her confidential letters of recommendation, financial 
information, and educational records. If able to obtain the information, as it often has, a newspaper 
would undoubtedly be protected in including it within a news story. The same is true for the Video 
Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000), which regulates information that a 
videotape service provider can disclose about its customers, in particular the subject matter of the 
videos its customers rent—though surely, if the press had this information, it could publish it, for 
instance if were about a judicial nominee (the Act was passed in part in reaction to the exposure of 
such information during the nomination of Judge Robert Bork for a Supreme Court seat). 
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a) (2000).  
 122. Id. § 1681c(a)(1). 
 123. Id. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii), § 1681b(g). 
BAKER.P2A 9/15/2007 7:28:10 PM 
990 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:955 
Moreover, often the credit reporting agency’s communications must 
include information that the consumer demands be included—for 
example, the fact that she disputes some of the information or that she is 
fearful that an identity theft is occurring.124 If applied to newspapers, all 
of these requirements—that it only communicate with certain people, 
that it not communicate various factual information about the past, that it 
communicate information demanded by the person described in the 
story, that it not communicate information about the person without her 
consent—would clearly be unconstitutional. Both credit agencies and the 
press are in the speech business, but the First Amendment apparently 
protects the speech of only one, the newspaper. 
2. Right of Publicity 
As copyright and privacy law illustrate, all areas of legally granting 
property rights in information or expression—in the material subject to 
communication—have been subject to severe and powerful legal 
critique. This proposition is true, too, for the so-called right of publicity, 
the right of a person to control the use of her image or persona.125 That 
general critique is not the present concern—rather the concern is the 
specific content of this modern, state-created, right of publicity.126 The 
New York legislature created the most famous version soon after its 
highest court in 1902 rejected a claim of a common law right of privacy 
against an advertiser who had used a picture of the plaintiff, a very 
attractive young girl, in its advertising for Franklin Mills Flour.127 The 
legislature created liability (and injunctive relief) for unauthorized “uses 
for advertising purposes, or the purposes of trade, [of] the name, portrait 
or picture of any living person . . . .”128 But, the courts tell us, purposes 
of trade do not include uses by the media in their constitutionally-
protected communicative roles.129 
Various versions of this statutory protection of the right of publicity 
are common. California law, for example, provides liability for “[a]ny 
person who [without prior consent] knowingly uses another’s name, 
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in 
                                                          
 124. Id. § 1681c-1. 
 125. See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and 
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993). 
 126. It is sometimes said that this right was first recognized in Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps 
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 31, 403-08 
(discussing the tort ensuing from the right of publicity). 
 127. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902). 
 128. N.Y. CIV. RIGHT L. §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1992). 
 129. See Finger v. Omni Publ’n Int’l, Ltd., 77 N.Y.2d 138, 143 (1990). 
BAKER.P2A 9/15/2007 7:28:10 PM 
2007] SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRESS CLAUSE 991 
products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or 
selling, or soliciting purchases . . . .”130 The modern trend toward 
recognizing such rights is widespread.131 Thus, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 652C provides: “One who appropriates to his own 
use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the 
other . . . .”132 
These limits on the “beneficial” or commercial uses of people’s 
name or image, if the rights are as broad as the initial statement suggests 
(i.e., “use . . . in products”) would destroy the press as we know it and 
especially undermine its Fourth Estate role. Unsurprisingly, exceptions 
to the various statutes and “comment d” to the Restatement make clear 
that the right does not cover legitimate media uses.133 Undoubtedly, 
publications often include stories, pictures, and details about celebrities 
to attract audiences or, more generally, for profit making reasons. Still, 
“comment d” of the Restatement insists:  
The fact that the defendant is engaged in the business of publication, 
for example of a newspaper, out of which he makes or seeks to make a 
profit, is not enough to make the incidental publication a commercial 
use of the name or likeness. Thus a newspaper . . . does not become 
liable under the rule stated in this Section to every person whose name 
or likeness it publishes.134  
Here, as the Restatement and many state statutes make clear, even 
though the press and other businesses both use people’s persona and 
                                                          
 130. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1999).  
 131. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from 
Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1167-75 (2006).  
 132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1976). 
 133. As used here, “legitimate” refers objectively to the type of use, not a subjective evaluation 
of the propriety of the editorial judgment. Given the constitutional role of the media, knowing 
falsehoods—e.g., falsehoods that are not mere negligent errors are not aspects of the press or of 
speech that is protected by the First Amendment. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 279-80 (1964). Thus, knowing (or probably reckless) falsity would deny the media content the 
status of being a protected press product and turn its use of a person’s image into a mere 
commercial use. See, e.g., Cher v. Forum Int’l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1982). On the other 
hand, some uses within advertising may not equate to a regulated advertising use. One court found 
that the press’s advertising for itself did not involve a commercial use of a person’s image when the 
advertisement merely printed a copy of the advertised publication to illustrate the publication’s 
content despite the copy containing a picture of a celebrity. See Booth v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 223 
N.Y.S.2d 737, 743-46 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962), aff’d without opinion, 11 N.Y.2d 907 (1962). 
 134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C, cmt. d (1976). The words “incidental” and 
“every” person suggest that sometimes a newspaper story could be the basis of liability but that has 
not been the case at least as to true accounts that would generally be protected by the First 
Amendment. 
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image to make money, when it is used for press purposes, the law does 
not grant the person used any “right to object.”135 
As described here, the difference between the treatment of the press 
and other businesses is a matter merely of statutory or common law 
grace. Surely, however, the notion that the law could require the press to 
gain consent before describing or picturing the day’s newsmakers or 
society’s corrupt officials is a constitutional non-starter. The currently 
accepted capacity of the state to give people rights against many 
commercial forms of exploitation of their image would be 
unconstitutional if the state attempted to restrict the press’s freedom to 
report on people’s role in the world or to print images of people 
participating in public life. Given the presumptively legitimate public 
interest in the full scope of people’s lives as a matter of awareness of the 
norms and foibles of the people in their society, the prominence or lack 
thereof of the person or the nature of the story is not likely to change this 
conclusion. Except for the lack of need due to the statutory exemption of 
the press, the constitutional basis for protecting the press’s use of 
people’s names or images could easily be developed using constitutional 
analyses from defamation and privacy cases as doctrinal resources. 
Thus, the right of publicity illustrates a distinction that currently exists 
statutorily between media enterprises and other business enterprises, but 
that constitutionally could not plausibly be eliminated by treating the 
press the way other commercial users are now treated. Although 
legislation and common law restrict some businesses’ profitable use of 
people’s personae or images in their product or to promote their product, 
it would be unconstitutional to do so to press’s use within its product—
no pictures of the candidates or the home run sluggers in the paper! Of 
course, there are line-drawing issues that may or may not have 
constitutional dimensions.136 Still, here, a constitutional difference surely 
exists between speech by the press and by other businesses. 
                                                          
 135. Id. 
 136. See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995); Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11-12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); Booth, 223 
N.Y.S.2d at 743-46. If the Press Clause is interpreted, as I have argued it should be, from the 
perspective of complex democracy to include cultural media that are important for people’s self-
definition and groups’ internal debates about identity and values, most cases where a persona or 
image of a person is the product itself, as opposed to merely being used in an advertisement or 
promotion, the Press Clause ought to prevent the right of publicity from being used to restrict this 
commercial use. Cf. Madow, supra note 125, at 239 (reaching this conclusion largely on policy 
grounds). 
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3. Campaign Expenditures 
A narrow five member majority initially granted First Amendment 
protection to corporate political expenditures in the context of referenda, 
reasoning that “[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity 
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, 
whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”137 Then in two 
subsequent cases, adopting reasoning closely paralleling a dissent in the 
earlier case, the Court reversed course.138 It emphasized the centrality of 
individual self-expression and the importance for First Amendment 
purposes of the actual speakers’ allegiance to the viewpoint expressed.139 
On this basis, the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission upheld strict limits on 
corporate use of money to support electoral candidates,140 relegating the 
notion of “[t]he inherent worth of the speech . . . for informing the 
public” to the wishes of very irate dissents.141 
Each restriction on corporate political speech either exempted the 
press or, in Bellotti, its applicability to the press was not before the 
Court.142 In upholding the restrictions in Austin, the Court rejected the 
non-media corporations’ argument that exempting the media violated 
equal protection.143 The much more troubling question—and an issue 
brought up in each case by those objecting to limits on corporate 
campaign speech—is whether the press must be exempted, that is, 
whether the First Amendment requires that the press be allowed to use 
its resources to write stories and publish commentary about 
candidates.144 (Portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002—“BCRA”—upheld by the Court barred non-media business 
corporations from using general treasury funds for broadcast ads that 
even “refer to” candidates in the period shortly before elections, which 
                                                          
 137. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). 
 138. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003); Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667-68 (1990).  
 139. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205; Austin, 494 U.S. at 666. 
 140. Obviously, the cases are formally distinguishable on grounds that the first involved a 
referendum and, thus, there was no candidate subject to corruption, but the rationale of the first case 
easily encompasses the later cases and rationale of the later cases is essentially the rationale of the 
dissent in the first. 
 141. Austin, 494 U.S. at 700 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 257 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); id. at 328 (Kennedy, J., dissenting as to this issue).  
 142. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781-82 n.17. 
 143. Austin, 494 U.S. at 667-68. 
 144. Id. at 667 (“We have consistently recognized the unique role that the press plays in 
‘informing and educating the public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and 
debate.’”) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 208. 
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raises the question of whether the press too could be barred from 
referring to candidates for political office during the period leading up to 
an election.)145 Surely, the answer must be that the First Amendment 
requires that the press be permitted to refer to political candidates. But 
without an independent meaning for the Press Clause, it is unclear how 
to make an argument for mandatory exemption. In contrast, given 
independent constitutional protection for the press, the argument is easy. 
Unlike other businesses, evaluation of candidates by the press is part of 
its constitutional role. Since surely no one would think BCRA can be 
permissibly applied to the news media in their media roles,146 if one also 
assumes (as I do)147 that existing doctrine is correct, that is, that the 
Court was correct to uphold restrictions on general corporate political 
participation, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that First Amendment 
must provide the press special protection different from and greater than 
that of other enterprises. 
The opposite view—that media cannot be distinguished from other 
businesses for First Amendment purposes—was, of course, a possibility 
advanced by the dissenting Justices. That conclusion would surely lead 
to striking down the restrictions on corporate expenditures. Thus, Justice 
Scalia, beginning with the assertion that the Court has “consistently 
rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional 
privilege beyond that of other speakers,” concludes that one can only 
“hope . . . that Michigan will continue to provide this generous and 
voluntary exemption,” a hope that he suggests should give the 
institutional press “little reason for comfort.”148 Justice Kennedy 
combines the conclusion, offered in reliance on a quote from Justice 
Brennan in Dun & Bradstreet that the institutional media has (at least in 
the context of that case) no special constitutional rights, with the point 
that “[i]t is beyond peradventure that the media could not be prohibited 
from speaking about candidate qualifications,” to conclude that the bar 
on corporate campaign expenditures must be invalid.149 In McConnell, 
Justice Thomas argues: “The chilling endpoint of the Court’s reasoning 
                                                          
 145. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (Supp. 2001-2004). 
 146. Like other corporations, presumably they can be restricted in the campaign contributions 
or campaign expenditures that are unrelated to their media business. 
 147. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 19, at 196-97; C. Edwin 
Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1170 (2004) [hereinafter Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen 
Freedom]; C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and 
Redish’s the Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 652 (1982). 
 148. Austin, 494 U.S. at 691-92. 
 149. Id. at 712 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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is not difficult to foresee: outright regulation of the press. . . . [N]one of 
the reasoning employed by the Court exempts the press . . . . The press 
now operates at the whim of Congress.”150 
Analytically correct conclusions are clear. One can strike down 
laws restricting corporate political expenditures without taking a 
position in regards to an independent interpretation of the Press Clause. 
But to uphold these laws, as the Court has done in both Austin and 
McConnell, requires the Court to at least implicitly accept an 
independent interpretation of the Press Clause. As Justice Kennedy put 
it, “it is beyond peradventure” that the Court would leave the press 
vulnerable to these regulations. The press must be exempt from these 
laws not simply as a matter of legislative grace but of constitutional 
right. And there seems no basis for that exemption absent an 
interpretation of the Press Clause that gives the media special rights.  
B. The Press Compared to Other Speaking Professions 
1. Duty of Care: Press Versus Accountants, Lawyers, or Other 
Speaking Professions 
Many businesses are liable for pecuniary losses caused by their 
supplying negligently “false information for the guidance of others in 
their business transactions.”151 The Ohio Supreme Court has held this 
duty applies to accountants in relation to their clients.152 Then, in Gutter 
v. Dow Jones, Inc., it distinguished accountants in explaining that this 
duty does not apply to newspapers in relation to its readers.153 In 
addition to describing how its holding represented the “general view” 
among jurisdictions about reasons for not holding the media liable for 
harms resulting from people’s reliance on its negligently false 
statements, the Court also emphasized that First Amendment principles 
likely preclude liability.154 
                                                          
 150. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 283, 286 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977). 
 152. The court described its earlier holding involving accountants. Haddon View Inv. Co. v. 
Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212, 215 (Ohio 1980) (citing Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. 
Supp. 85, 93 (D.R.I. 1968)). 
 153. Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ohio 1986).  
 154. See id. at 901. The court also noted factual differences between the communications of 
newspapers and accountants—the number of clients or customers who might rely on the 
communication and the reasonableness of the reliance—that arguably support, on policy grounds, 
the distinction. Whether the product of any business other than the press is “communications to the 
world” is unclear but, if so, an attempt to impose liability on that business might test the issue of 
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This merely represents one of many areas where professionals of 
various sorts are subject to liability for negligent speech while the press 
generally receives greater protection. “Speaking professions” commonly 
are subject to malpractice liability for negligently failing to base advice 
on facts or wisdom they are expected to possess; they can even be liable 
for failure to speak when required by professional standards.155 That is 
true, for example, in the context of regulation of the medical 
profession156 and lawyers.157 Speech restrictions designed to maintain 
quality of performance of these speaking professions are and should be 
upheld. This standard applied for liability is, however, a far cry from 
standards typically applied to the press. There, criteria for liability are 
typically “reckless disregard of the truth” or “knowingly false,” which 
apply to the press in tort law as illustrated most clearly by defamation 
law, or versions of the clear and present danger test, which applies in 
many other situations.158  
For example, the First Amendment allows regulation of lawyers if 
the regulation is designed to assure their proper performance—though 
the notion of proper performance may have constitutional overtones 
itself given the constitutional establishment of their role in maintaining 
due process.159 Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a majority in 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, held that a defense attorney, during the 
pendency of a case in which she is involved, can be punished for having 
a press conference in which she (truthfully) offers her view about the 
innocence of her client and the existence of police corruption even 
though this speech would clearly be protected if made either by a private 
                                                          
whether the First Amendment protection that the court discussed applied to all business because of 
the context. More likely, the protection applied especially to newspapers (or media), the entities of 
First Amendment concern that the court emphasized throughout its opinion and were emphasized in 
the cases it cited and in its quote from American Jurisprudence 2d. See id. at 900.  
 155. Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional 
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 834-50 (1999).  
 156. See id. at 834; see generally Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First 
Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV 939. 
 157. See Halberstam, supra note 155, at 834. 
 158. Compare Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (noting the standard 
for liability that applies to the press in tort law and quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)) and Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 
1987) (applying the incitement test from Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), to deny media 
liability) with Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1038-39 (1991) (discussing the standard 
that applies to lawyers). 
 159. The central difference between the opinions of the majority and dissent in Gentile can be 
read as a disagreement about the appropriate conception of the lawyer’s role, and on that a very 
good case can be made that the dissent had the better of the argument. 
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individual or the press.160 That is, Rehnquist rejected a “clear and present 
danger” of “actual prejudice or an imminent threat” standard and 
rejected other analogies to protection of speech by the press as 
appropriate standards to be met “before any discipline may be imposed 
on a lawyer who initiates a press conference such as [the one conducted 
in Gentile].”161 More generally, the clear and present danger standard 
that the Court has applied to communications by individuals162 and the 
press163 for speech about pending legal proceedings is precisely the 
speech that the Court in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart suggested 
restricting in the case of participating lawyers.164 Lawyers, it seems, 
because of their occupation or “business” have less speech rights than 
the First Amendment provides the press (or private individuals). 
2. Licensing Securities Advisors 
In Lowe v. SEC, the Court avoided the question of whether the 
government can require a newspaper that provides the public with 
financial information to be licensed under rules that allow the 
government to deny or revoke the license for past unethical or illegal 
behavior.165 Surely, however, such a regime would constitute a system of 
prior restraints.166 The law at issue, however, provided such licensure 
requirements for securities advisors.167 Although Lowe was now 
seemingly publishing a newsletter, the SEC characterized his practice as 
coming under the law and took action to prevent him from continuing to 
distribute his newsletter. The Court majority rejected this result by 
                                                          
 160. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1071. 
 161. Id. at 1069. 
 162. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260-62 (1941). 
 163. Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976). By counting Justices, Nebraska 
Press can be read to leave open the possibility of even greater protection than offered by the clear 
and present danger test, namely for Justice Brennan’s view that an injunction should never be issued 
to stop publication by the press of information about criminal proceedings. Likewise, in referring to 
Bridges context, Justice Brennan asserted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan that the speech not 
only does not lose its protection because the utterances contain misinformation and half-truths but 
also that “repression [of the speech] can be justified, if at all, only by a clear and present danger of 
the obstruction of justice,” which “Bridges’ threat to cripple the economy of the entire West Coast” 
apparently did not create. 376 U.S. 254, 272-73 (1964) (emphasis added); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624 (1978). 
 164. Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 552-54 (citing with approval such steps as 
recommended in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966)). 
 165. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 189-90, 211 (1985). 
 166. Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (prior objectionable behavior was found not 
to be basis for enjoining future publication). 
 167. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 203-09 (discussing the licensure requirements and exceptions under 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2). 
BAKER.P2A 9/15/2007 7:28:10 PM 
998 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:955 
finding that Lowe came within the statutory exception for the publishers 
of a “bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or financial 
publication of general and regular circulation.”168 
No one questioned that these licensure requirements could be 
imposed on the business of investment advising, but would the 
Constitution permit them to be imposed on the press? In many ways, the 
question resembles the issue of the accepted authority of the government 
to impose license requirements on speaking professions—say doctors or 
psychiatrists or lawyers—as a precondition for practicing their trade 
despite the recognized right of newspapers to have its journalists or 
columnists write medical reports or columns, personal self-help advice 
columns, or legal columns that provide information that many people 
rely on in lieu of going to a professional. In these examples, the law 
requires neither the newspaper nor its “reporters” or columnists to have a 
professional license, at least as long as neither the paper nor its reporter 
falsely claims to be a doctor or lawyer. Still, both the person for whom 
the law requires a license and the publication and its writers are in the 
business of providing information, opinion, and advice and the content 
of the information or advice may be identical in each case. What, then, is 
the relevant difference? Only the latter is the “press.” This fact 
apparently bars imposing the license requirement. 
In Lowe, Justice White, joined by two other Justices, found that the 
statute did cover Lowe.169 This interpretation raised the question of 
government power noted above. Without questioning the power of the 
government to require a revocable license for security advisors, Justice 
White then concluded that the statute violated the First Amendment 
when applied to Lowe. He was not entirely clear about the basis of his 
conclusion—for example, he did not decide whether Lowe’s speech was 
“fully protected” or was “commercial.” And he did not specifically rest 
on the Press Clause as opposed to the protection the First Amendment 
provides for speaking and publishing.170 However, his method of 
distinguishing this case from regulatable speech of professionals looked 
precisely at the factors that distinguish the professionals’ business from 
the press—factors such as a “personal nexus between professional and 
client.”171 In other words, it seems that the premise required for the 
proper result—a result that one suspects the rest of the Court would 
reach except for their different statutory interpretation and would surely 
                                                          
 168. See id. at 210; 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(D) (2000).  
 169. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 211 (White, J., concurring). 
 170. See id. at 234-35. 
 171. See id. at 232. 
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reach if the law were applied to the reporters for the business section of 
the New York Times—is that the press is a special constitutionally-
protected business. 
3. Speaking Professions and the Perversion of Defamation Law 
As noted in the introduction and contrary to some interpretations, 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.172 does not require 
rejection of an independent status of the Press Clause. The Court only 
refused to give the press greater protection than given an individual.173 
The Court’s reasoning, however, is problematic. Though right not to 
distinguish the press from individuals,174 by failing to distinguish the 
press from credit reporting agencies, the Court cast doubt on the logic of 
vast areas of law that treat the press differently than other businesses. 
Thus, here I offer three observations. First, the Court could have reached 
its final result much more easily than it did. Second, the method it chose 
greatly and unwisely deformed defamation law. Finally, if read as 
rejecting an independent role of the Press Clause, this decision would 
come at the cost of destroying the whole regime of regulation of credit 
reporting agencies in particular and regulation of medical records and 
other databases in general. 
In Dun & Bradstreet, the majority of the Court stated that the media 
did not have greater protection in defamation suits than individuals do.175 
Any other holding would, I believe, be absurd. Given that defamation 
law normally (though the exceptions are considerable) treats repeaters of 
defamatory content as if they were original speakers,176 giving lesser 
protection to individuals leads to the absurdist image of a person at the 
breakfast table reading a passage from a newspaper to her partner and 
then being held liable for her reading while the First Amendment 
protects the newspaper that originally published the story. But to say that 
the press receives no greater protection than an individual does not mean 
that it cannot receive greater protection than other businesses. Such a 
view would have allowed the Court to reach the outcome it reached. 
Instead, by failing to recognize this role for the Press Clause, the 
plurality found it could only reach its (correct, in my view) result of 
upholding liability for the credit agency by deforming defamation law in 
                                                          
 172. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
 173. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.  
 174. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 753.  
 175. Id. at 773 (White, J., concurring); id. at 784 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 176. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977).  
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two unfortunate ways.177 The plurality, first, increased the general 
availability of punitive damages in defamation law—which also 
increased the practical significance of the difficult task of drawing lines 
between matters of public concern and purely private information; 
second, it gave the notion of “matters of public concern” an intolerably 
narrow interpretation.178 
As to the first point, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, the Court announced 
that a “private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less 
demanding standard than that stated by New York Times may recover 
only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual 
injury.”179 This complete rejection of punitive damages absent a showing 
of New York Times actual malice was also noted in opinions of other 
Justices.180 The important limitation the Court changed eleven years later 
in Dun & Bradstreet. In respect to speech that is not on “matters of 
public concern,” that is, “speech on matters of purely private concern,” 
the plurality in Dun & Bradstreet held “that the state interest adequately 
supports awards of presumed and punitive damages—even absent a 
showing of ‘actual malice.’”181 This holding troublingly expands the 
potential for punitive damages in defamation cases182 unless the category 
of matters “not of public concern” is a null set. 
The second move, criticized vigorously by Brennan’s dissent as a 
radical and ill-advised departure, is the plurality’s characterization of the 
speech at issue. Brennan’s complaint is that speech reporting the 
bankruptcy of a local employer is “potentially of great concern to 
residents of the community” and comes well within the category of a 
matter of public concern as that term had previously been used.183 
                                                          
 177. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757-63. 
 178. Id. On the dangers of bowing to majoritarian norms implicit in this line-drawing, see 
Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Cos., 712 P.2d 803, 809 (Or. 1986). 
 179. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). The Court asserted essentially this 
proposition repeatedly. For example, it said: “We also find no justification for allowing awards of 
punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held liable under state-defined standards of 
liability for defamation.” Id. “It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury.” Id. at 
349.  
 180. See id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 368-69 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
 181. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759, 761.  
 182. Five of the Justices in Dun & Bradstreet observe that this amounts to a rejection of Gertz 
and an expansion of when liability can occur. See id. at 772 (White, J., concurring); id. at 785 n.11 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 183. Id. at 789. Interestingly, Justice Brennan argues that the bankruptcy report is a matter of 
public concern and, even if it were not, is “well within the range of valuable expression for which 
the First Amendment demands protection.” Id. at 790 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, 
implicitly accepting the relevance of Gertz’s rule structure in this context, quotes a law review 
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Justice Powell’s explanation for a contrary conclusion is difficult to 
construct and appears to be entirely driven by his effort to achieve the 
right result—subjecting the credit reporting agency’s speech to legal 
regulation.184 Justice Powell cites a holding that concluded that, for 
purposes of the speech rights of government employees, the 
determination of whether their speech was a matter of public concern 
depended on its “content, form, and context.”185 Although Brennan 
suggested that Justice Powell “appear[s] to focus on primarily on subject 
matter” (that is, “content”), Justice Powell actually never says anything 
about subject matter but only about form and context.186 Justice Powell 
does point to the relevance of contextual factors that characterize the 
credit report as speech offered by a business (the report was done for 
profit and had other qualities that the Court has identified with 
commercial speech) and other factors that also typify credit reporting but 
that distinguish it from media speech (the report had a limited, discrete 
audience who are contractually prohibited from further circulating the 
information).187 On this basis, the result would have been easy if Justice 
Powell had merely asserted that First Amendment protection accorded 
individuals and the press did not encompass the speech of (at least some) 
non-media businesses. This step, the basis for which he had laid, would 
implicitly recognize the independent significance of the Press Clause. 
Failure to take it and instead to announce purportedly general principles 
led directly to the deformation of defamation law identified here. 
The Court’s refusal to rest liability on the difference between the 
press and credit reporting agencies initially caused fear in the press 
about potential liability under the Dun & Bradstreet standard. 
Nevertheless, reasons for worry apparently have not materialized. 
Courts, properly disinclined to second guess editors about what is of 
public concern, have in effect treated the press differently from other 
                                                          
article that shows that the Fair Credit Reporting Act would, as does Gertz, allow liability here for 
negligence but that the Act is best interpreted to rule out, as would Gertz, punitive damages. That is, 
despite the wide disparity between the speech regulations imposed by the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
and those that would be constitutional if applied to the press, Brennan appears not to object to the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, thereby implicitly being committed, as the earlier discussion of privacy 
showed, to a separate interpretation of the Press Clause. Id. at 796 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Virginia G. Maurer, Common Law Defamation and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 72 GEO. 
L.J. 95, 126 (1983)); see also Brennan, supra note 10 at 175-77.  
 184. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761-63.  
 185. Id. at 761. Brennan complained that the Court had explicitly limited this test, taken from 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), to the public employee “context.” Id. at 789-90 n.14 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 186. Compare id. at 786 (Brennan, J., dissenting) with id. at 761-62. 
 187. Id. at 762-63. 
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businesses by deferring to the press’s judgments about what matters are 
of public concern.188 Brennan had already observed that the speech in 
Dun & Bradstreet “would clearly receive the comprehensive protections 
of Gertz were the speech publicly disseminated.”189 In effect, lower 
courts, and maybe Justice Powell, have sub rosa embodied an 
independent reading of the Press Clause in their interpretation of 
“context” as a criterion of “public importance.”190 The fact that the press 
originates the speech seems in practice to represent a “context” that 
shows that it is of public importance and should receive protection. 
Interestingly, existing regulations of the speaking professions and 
of credit reporting in behalf of protecting privacy illustrate that the route 
not taken in Dun & Bradstreet is firmly embedded in existing law. 
Nevertheless, Dun & Bradstreet leaves defamation as an area where I 
cannot claim that the Court has implicitly recognized the independent 
significance of the Press Clause. However, it represents an area where 
the failure to recognize this principle has led to doctrinal shambles and 
where the pressure for the correct principle, an independent status for the 
press, has led to its sub rosa acceptance that fortunately allows for 
appropriate protection of the press. Certainly, recognizing the Press 
Clause as distinguishing the press from other businesses is by far the 
easiest way to reach a result that the Court reached—upholding state 
defined standards of liability for inappropriate, here false, credit 
reporting. (This interpretation would also allow the dissent to use the 
significant—even though reduced—protection granted commercial 
speech to frame its objection to the majority’s conclusion.) 
C. Other Reduced Speech Rights of Non-Media Businesses 
1. Compelled Identification of Non-Media Originated Speech 
Part II observed that statutes often require the media to identify the 
source of communication content that it was paid to carry. Of course, as 
the Court of Appeals observed in SEC v. Wall Street Publishing 
Institute, Inc., “forcing a magazine to label its contents as published in 
return for consideration received from the subject of its articles carries 
an inherently pejorative connotation.”191 Still, the court there upheld the 
general requirement to disclose the fact of consideration and the amount 
                                                          
 188. FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 31, at 312. 
 189. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 795 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 190. See, e.g., id. at 762 n.8; id. at 786 n.12, 795 n.18.  
 191. SEC v. Wall Street Publ’g Inst. Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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paid for publishing a story promoting a particular financial security.192 
This compelled identification could either deter the media from carrying 
the “paid for” speech or deter the entity that paid from being willing to 
do so. In either event, the requirement “burdens” the speech. Miami 
Herald teaches that the government cannot punish or penalize the media 
for its choice to carry particular (protected) content, for example by 
requiring it to include additional unwanted content in response to its 
initial speech choices.193 That “penalty” is precisely what is 
accomplished by requiring the media to identify material as paid content. 
The two holdings are in apparent conflict. 
The special constitutional status of the press eliminates the conflict. 
If the media receives special protection only for speech it originates (and 
that is constitutionally valued precisely because the speech originated in 
an independent press), and if this protection is not given to other 
commercial entities for their speech, the mandatory disclosure should 
not be troublesome. The mandated disclosure will burden or deter 
speech, but only speech whose ultimate basis lies in another, non-media 
business.194 Thus, for the Court to uphold the provision of the Securities 
Act that makes it unlawful to describe a security for consideration 
unlawful without disclosing the fact and the amount of consideration195 
makes sense only if the rights recognized in Miami Herald apply only to 
the press (and maybe private individuals), but not to businesses in 
general.196 In fact, as discussed in Part II, requiring this disclosure 
enhances rather than violates the institutional integrity of the media. 
                                                          
 192. The court held that mere receipt of free text would not amount to consideration, but the 
facts alleged could show the necessary quid pro quo. Id. 
 193. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974); Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 653-56 (1994). 
 194. Presumably, the other business that paid to have its message carried could itself be a 
media entity—certainly the media actively advertise their products. The type of speech for which a 
Fourth Estate interpretation of the Press Clause requires protection is, however, the speech that 
originates in the Fourth Estate entity identified with the speech. In having another media entity 
promote its media content by carrying its message, the media entity is in the same position of any 
other business—and presumably can be required to self-identify. See infra note 206. 
  More interesting is if the outside payment comes not from a business but an individual 
claiming a speech right to pay for politically salient speech and also asserting free speech rights of 
anonymity. Here, requiring the media to identify the source, thereby discouraging the individual’s 
anonymous speech, must be understood as holding that individuals, although free to maintain 
anonymity on their own (e.g., in their leafleting), can be prohibited from activities that undermine 
the integrity of the media as legislatively understood, a holding for which Associated Press v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1936), provides ample support. 
 195. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (2000). 
 196. Another way to describe this conclusion is to find the “paid for content” constitutes 
commercial speech, a rather obvious conclusion in most cases. The court, however, rejected this 
characterization of the paid-for promotional speech in Wall Street Publishing but instead argued: 
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2. Commercial Speech 
The last discussion may be merely an illustration of a more general 
distinction between the speech of media enterprises and other 
businesses. As is well known, in an earlier period the Court,197 and even 
so-called First Amendment absolutists on and off the Court,198 found 
commercial speech entirely outside First Amendment protection.199 
Since the early 1970s, however, the Court has accorded commercial 
speech some, but reduced, protection—with the extent of subsequent 
protection actually, though not “officially,” waxing and waning.200 Thus, 
even now, commercial speech is subject to many regulations that are 
clearly unconstitutional if applied to the press.201 Prior restraints are 
allowed. The government can require that advertisers include 
communicative content—i.e., disclosures—which is a requirement that 
would constitute an unconstitutional penalty on the advertising speech 
under any interpretation of Miami Herald. Misleading commercial 
speech is subject to prohibition—but think of applying that restriction to 
either the speech of politicians or stories in newspapers! Falsity in 
                                                          
“Speech relating to the purchase and sale of securities, in our view, forms a distinct category of 
communications in which the government’s power to regulate is at least as broad as with respect to 
the general rubric of commercial speech.” Wall Street Publ’g Inst. Inc., 851 F.2d at 373 (emphasis 
added, though the court proceeded to suggest these communications were even more subject to 
regulation than commercial speech). Since the speech itself did not propose the “purchase or sell of 
securities” or directly relate to such sales, the court might understand “relating to” as meaning 
“likely to” or maybe “intended to” influence sales or purchases of securities. Such an interpretation 
would seem to cover most newspaper financial advice columns and maybe even news stories about 
public companies. If this means that these newspaper columns and stories are subject to routine 
regulation, the result would be in huge tension with the First Amendment. The better reading of the 
opinion is probably to understand the court as limiting its point to regulating the “communication of 
the regulated parties.” Id. at 372. This reading is even more appropriate given that the court, in its 
interpretation of “consideration,” was careful to describe it narrowly enough to avoid interference 
with the normal practices of the media and cited approvingly Miami Herald’s protection of the 
editorial integrity of the press. Id. at 374. If this reading is correct, the court essentially adopts the 
view, argued for in the text, that businesses when engaged in the sale of securities have different and 
lesser protections for its corresponding speech activities than does the media when engaged in its 
Fourth Estate function. 
 197. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 
 198. See Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom, supra note 147, at 1162 (noting 
that Justice Black, Meiklejohn, Emerson and others, including eminent free speech theorists such as 
John Stuart Mill, would exclude commercial speech from the scope of free speech principles). 
 199. See id.; see also Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54. 
 200. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virgina Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 772 (1976) (“In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we 
have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms.”); Baker, Paternalism, Politics, 
and Citizen Freedom, supra note 147, at 1162-63. 
 201. The Court provided a list of permissible restrictions, noted in the text, which at this point 
are not, I believe, controversial. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24. 
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commercial speech does not get even the limited protection of Gertz’s 
requirement of fault. These restrictions all apply even before coming to 
the Central Hudson test, which further allows regulation of content if the 
government can show it provides a properly narrow means to advance an 
important state purpose.202 There the Court suggested that New York 
could bar advertising that undermined energy conservation—although it 
invalidated the restriction before it for being overbroad and not narrowly 
tailored to these energy conservation goals.203 
Normally, the issue of commercial speech has not been considered 
from the perspective of the issue considered here—whether the Press 
Clause provides independent protection to the media business. Rather, 
the point has simply been that commercial speech is a protected—but 
not fully protected—category of speech. Here, however, the questions 
are first, whether the communications of the commercial, profit-oriented 
mass media are commercial speech—they are usually designed to make 
money for the publisher. Second, if not commercial speech, how does 
the Court distinguish commercial speech and media?  
As early as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court distinguished 
the speech of newspapers sold for profit (as well as the advertisement 
placed by activists) from commercial speech, holding that neither the 
advertising format nor the general commercial rationale for newspaper 
publication justified treating the press as a commercial speaker.204 More 
recently, as a necessary step in upholding a statute that appeared to bar 
broadcast of all lottery information, the Court strained to interpret it not 
to cover the press’s own publication of the information but only 
advertising involving lotteries.205 The Court quite clearly does not 
consider the content of commercial media to constitute commercial 
speech despite the profit motive that lies behind it and even when the 
media content is identical to regulatable commercial speech. As the list 
of ways in which commercial speech can be regulated makes clear, 
treating the media’s product as commercial speech would drastically 
contradict existing doctrine protecting media speech. 
Thus, the second question becomes the interesting one: how are the 
two different? On the factual level, the most obvious difference is that 
                                                          
 202. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64, 576 
(1980). 
 203. Id. at 570-71. 
 204. In distinguishing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), the Court said: “That the 
Times was paid for publishing the [editorial] advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is 
the fact that newspapers and books are sold.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 
(1964).  
 205. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 429-30 (1993). 
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the speech of the press is its product, while the speech of other 
businesses instrumentally aims to aid its sale of its non-speech products 
or its other endeavors to achieve profits.206 In fact, this is the answer that 
in a moment I will assert is also constitutionally salient—but note that it 
has constitutional relevance only if the press is constitutionally a 
specially protected business such that its product, even if it has the same 
expressive content as something put out by another business, receives 
protection. But first consider whether there are any good alternatives. 
One possible alternative, the profit orientation of speakers, has already 
been shown not to work.207 Both media and other businesses are 
typically profit oriented. Rather, possibly the most common attempt to 
offer an alternative is to focus on content. The expectation is that 
commercial speech is identified by its content and it receives reduced 
protection because of something about this content. Certainly, content 
has been a central feature of other areas of reduced or denied First 
Amendment protection. It is the primary factor that identifies obscenity; 
and false content, combined with fault, is central to defamation. Various 
Court statements in commercial speech cases focus on content.208 
Nevertheless, content has never been a determinative factor.209 In 
the foundational case, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., using examples such as ads for 
                                                          
 206. Of course, the media also advertises and otherwise promotes its media, that is, speech, 
products. It is unlikely that the press’s constitutionally protected Fourth Estate role would suggest a 
right to an exemption from a general regulation of advertising or solicitation any more than from a 
general regulation of its labor practices or wages. In contrast, a regulation specifically of the 
media’s self-promotion would be hard to interpret other than as an attempt to burden the press in its 
protected role of communicating with the public. Roughly, this reasoning was sometimes invoked to 
explain Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), decided the year before Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy, made clear that commercial speech was protected. The argument was that Bigelow 
showed the impermissibility of specifically barring information, even when communicated by 
advertising, about a constitutionally protected activity—abortions. Similar is a possible 
interpretation of Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, 745 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962), 
aff’d without opinion, 11 N.Y.2d 907 (1962) (denying application of New York’s privacy—read, 
“right of publicity”—statute to a magazine’s use of a picture of a person previously published in its 
magazine for an advertisement for the magazine). The argument is that applying the law here would 
prevent only publications, not other businesses, from using pictures of its product in its 
advertisements—and thus this application would be a media-specific limit on advertising. In any 
event, the issue is not crucial for the argument here, and I put it aside. 
 207. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266; Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg 
Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).  
 208. Still, probably descriptively the most accurate of the Court’s discussions involving 
commercial speech, which occurred in one of the few cases where identification was difficult, 
makes content only one factor. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983). 
 209. See generally Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom, supra note 147 
(discussing the distinction between content and speaker identity as factors in the analysis of 
commercial speech cases).  
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artificial furs as an alternative to those that contribute to the extinction of 
fur-bearing mammals or for domestically produced products that are said 
to preserve American jobs, the Court noted that sometimes commercial 
speech will refer to public issues about which speech by the individuals 
or the media would undoubtedly be fully protected.210 Content, in other 
words, is not what turned the ads into commercial speech. Rather, it was 
something about the identity of the speaker. Actually, in all cases of 
regulation of commercial speech, the law applied only to businesses 
promoting their commercial interests. The laws were never general bans 
on a category of speech defined by content—the laws did not restrict the 
same content published by others.211 The occasionally offered argument 
that the regulations manifest a paternalistic governmental view, namely, 
that people should not be exposed to particular information or 
assertions,212 has never been quite right. Those not involved in market 
transactions promoted by the restricted speech—that is, individuals, or 
consumer and other public interest groups, or newspapers—have always 
been left free to communicate. They are free to say smoking is great, 
turn up the air conditioner, or that drug prices are less at these stores 
than at those.213 That is, if there is paternalism, the paternalism is about 
the parties who should participate in the discourse, not about what is said 
or what people should read or hear. Flesh and blood individuals, their 
non-commercial associations, and the media always have full discourse 
rights. 
Possibly, the point about content not being the basis of regulation is 
best illustrated by a series of lower court cases. The same expressive 
content about the science, efficacy or other features of some product, 
process, or activity might be either published as a book sold for a profit 
or distributed without, or at a reduced, cost by a commercial enterprise 
with the aim to promote the profitable sale of the firm’s products or 
business. The same content, the very same book, might even play both 
roles in separate contexts. When faced with this dichotomy, lower courts 
have been quite uniform in their results.214 The communicative content is 
fully protected speech when sold as a media product and is commercial 
speech subject to regulation for being misleading when provided within 
                                                          
 210. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 764 (1976).  
 211. An exception is the language of the statute in Edge Broadcasting noted earlier, but the 
Court interpreted it to apply only to advertising, thereby justifying the claim in the text above. 
 212. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769-70.  
 213. Justice Rehnquist emphasized this point in his dissent in Virginia State Board. See id. at 
782 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 214. See infra note 215.  
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a promotional campaign for a firm or its products.215 Thus, the 
distinction between commercial speech and media publications is neither 
the aim of profits nor the content. There seems little explanation for the 
constitutionally salient distinction other than the identity of the parties. 
That is, the business of the press, whose media content is its product, is 
constitutionally special and receives a degree of First Amendment 
protection that other businesses, whose speech content is not their 
product but is used instrumentally to advance profits, do not receive. 
3. Discriminatory Taxation 
Government authority to tax media businesses is unabashedly 
limited in ways that its authority to tax other businesses clearly is not. In 
general, governments can discriminate incredibly between businesses in 
imposing tax liability—imposing unique taxes that in addition to raising 
revenue clearly (and, one suspects, purposively) suppress demand for the 
products of the targeted businesses. Basically, at least since 1935, the 
Federal Constitution imposes almost no meaningful limits on discretion 
in the use of the federal taxing power to further virtually any policy 
goal.216 State power too is largely constitutionally unconstrained—
though state taxes cannot discriminate against out-of-state businesses in 
violation of the Commerce Clause. Only in extraordinary circumstances, 
for example, an application of a state tax that dramatically violates a 
state’s declared legal policy about its taxes, has the Court found a state 
tax practice irrational enough to violate equal protection.217 
In contrast, since the ill-fated stamp taxes of the eighteenth century, 
the taxing power has been seen as a threat to a free press.218 Although it 
                                                          
 215. The issue usually comes up in the context of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) or state 
unfair competition statutes. See, e.g., Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 
F. Supp. 1521, 1544 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that articles were fully protected when initially 
published but were commercial speech subject to regulation under Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 
(2000), when distributed as promotional materials to encourage purchase of defendant’s products). 
Compare Oxycal Lab., Inc. v. Jeffers, 909 F. Supp. 719, 726 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (finding book 
protected when, despite its relevance to commercial transactions, the book was not used as 
promotional material), with Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 113-14 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that article constituted commercial speech when publication may reflect the willingness of 
the company that employed the author to take out advertising in the publication and where article 
was used as promotional material in trade shows and communications to customers). 
 216. See JESSE H. CHOPER, RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., YALE KAMISAR & STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 111 (9th ed. 2001) (“since [United States v.] Constantine, [296 U.S. 287 
(1935),] no federal tax has been held invalid because of a regulatory motive outside federal power”). 
 217. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 346 (1989). 
 218. Often opposition to these “taxes on knowledge” is given a rose-tinted account. Initial 
American opposition to the Stamp Act had more to do with colonial objections to taxation without 
representation than any concern with the press freedom. In England, a plausible historical account 
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is unquestioned that the media is subject to general taxes, special tax 
treatment is another story. I will not here try to summarize or reconcile 
this disputed area of doctrine,219 but it is clear that significant First 
Amendment limits exist to the taxation of the press. For example, the 
government cannot justify a tax placed specifically on the press by the 
claim that it is merely seeking to raise revenue—the alternative view that 
the tax purposefully burdens press freedom seems obvious given the 
government’s inability to reply to press’s query: if only interested in 
revenue, why not apply the tax more generally, not just to us?220 After a 
series of cases invalidating media taxes as discriminatory, many 
observers concluded that the First Amendment imposed “a 
nondiscrimination principle for like-situated members of the press.”221 
Though it is now established that the government can differentially grant 
exemptions to different segments of the media, including different 
segments within a single general category,222 any tax policy that seems 
oriented toward specially burdening the media or burdening particular 
out-of-favor media entities is clearly unconstitutional.223 
Thus, the constitutional power to tax is more restricted for media 
businesses than others. Though these tax cases might be seen as free 
speech or general First Amendment cases, not free press cases, this logic 
does not entirely work. As this Section has emphasized, from merely a 
speech perspective, it is difficult to distinguish between businesses. A 
special tax on an oil company limits its capacity to speak just as a tax on 
the press limits its speech capacity. Maybe a special tax on the press can 
                                                          
given by James Curran and Jean Seaton is that the stamp taxes, initially intended to control the press 
serving the rabble, had backfired. JAMES CURRAN & JEAN SEATON, POWER WITHOUT 
RESPONSIBILITY, THE PRESS AND BROADCASTING IN BRITAIN 12, 26 (5th ed. 1997). Radical, 
working-class papers flourished by illegally not paying the tax that established middle and upper 
class competitors paid. Id. at 12. Their non-payment counterbalanced the advertising “subsidy” 
received by the established press, and on this comparatively equal playing field, these radical papers 
flourished. Id. As some members of Parliament realized, by eliminating the tax, the established 
papers could competitively undersell the radical papers, taking enough audience away to bankrupt 
them. Elimination of the tax was, thus, at least in part a means not to free knowledge but to suppress 
radical working-class papers. Id. at 26. 
 219. See C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 130-32 (1994). 
 220. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 
(1983). 
 221. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 454 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Although I 
never viewed this as a correct description of the principles in this area, in discussion I heard it from 
many media scholars before Medlock, most of whom expected the challenge in that case to prevail. 
 222. Id. at 453. 
 223. Id. at 444-47. 
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be understood as having a bad purpose.224 The bad purpose, however, 
would be to burden specifically the press, or some part of it, as 
compared to other businesses. To object to that purpose requires a notion 
of the special constitutional status of the press. 
4. An Excursus: Structural Regulation 
In other writings, I have argued that the Court interprets the First 
Amendment to allow great structural regulation of the media in virtually 
any manner, despite sometimes harming or disadvantaging particular 
media entities, as long as the structural regulation can reasonably be 
thought to represent a plausible legislative judgment about how to 
improve the democratic quality or societal value of the media. In fact, I 
have gone beyond that argument and claimed that the Supreme Court 
has never invalidated a true structural regulation of the media225—
although this assertion cannot be applied to lower federal courts. 
Apparent exceptions always involve situations where the law is better 
characterized as involving a content-based suppression or penalty on 
particular types of communicative content.226 Here, however, I want to 
offer an observation pointing in the opposite direction. 
In the post-Lochner era, almost any structural regulation of 
business—regulation of who has power to make various decisions, what 
conditions must be met for the power to exist, the relations between 
different parts of the business (think of labor and corporate law), who 
owns the business, under what conditions, and with what powers—either 
                                                          
 224. Though the difference between intent or motive on the one hand and purpose on the other 
is important, with the latter usually being constitutionally dispositive, Leathers questions whether 
this characterization is crucial, stating that “illicit legislative intent” is not required. Id. at 445.  
 225. Baker, Turner Broadcasting, supra note 19, at 93-94; BAKER, supra note 87, at 124-62; 
Los Angeles v. Preferred Commications, Inc. is a possible exception, though the Court did not 
invalidate the law but merely reinstated a cause of action, thus leaving my claim in the text formally 
true. Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494-96 (1986). Still, Preferred 
Communications is an exceptional case. A typical policy issue in structural regulation is whether the 
government should intervene to prevent concentration and disperse ownership. In Preferred 
Communications, the challenged law intervened to assure monopoly ownership. Id. at 492. Though 
in fact policy arguments can be made favoring that choice, especially if the cable company is 
operated more like a common carrier, the Court indicated that for the government to create a 
monopoly control of a particular form of communication would be unconstitutional unless the 
government could make an adequate showing that competition would undermine the media that 
people receive or otherwise create some significant problem. Id. at 494. 
 226. For example, Miami Herald gave both structural and content penalty arguments to justify 
invalidating the right-of-reply statute, which would indicate the Court’s willingness to strike down 
the statute for its improper structural features, but subsequently in Turner Broadcasting the Court 
implicitly rejected the structural objection in favor of the content penalty analysis. Compare Miami 
Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-58 (1974), with Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 
512 U.S. 622, 640-42 (1994). 
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in general or in relation to specific business types, is uncontroversially 
constitutional. In contrast, such structural regulation of a flesh and blood 
body that determines who has authority is virtually an incoherent notion, 
unthinkable in the post-slavery world.227 This might be a slight 
overstatement—some acceptable regulations of individuals may be 
characterized as structural,228 but for the most part legal regulation of 
people is probably better described as behavioral. So structural is a 
category of legal regulation that seems best understood as related to 
artificial, not natural entities. And, as to these artificial entities, 
government has generally unassailable freedom to make the rules as it 
likes and for purposes it chooses—until it comes to the media. 
Even if I am right that the government can structurally regulate the 
media in any case where it can make a good faith claim that it does so 
for legitimate reasons, these structural regulations are inevitably 
challenged in the courts and are widely thought to raise real First 
Amendment issues. The point here is that the expanse of acceptable 
reasons available to justify regulation of most businesses is, as the tax 
cases surely indicate, narrower in the context of the media. Proper 
challenges, I believe, are ones that can show that the challenged 
regulation is best understood as aimed at interfering with or burdening 
the press’s broad Fourth Estate role. Given what I consider the best 
theory of democracy, the media has multiple, somewhat conflicting 
Fourth Estate roles, and very different regulations can represent 
plausible judgments about legitimate regulation with which courts 
should not interfere. Still, the widely recognized greater vulnerability to 
constitutional challenge of structural regulations of the media, like the 
greater protection of the media from discriminatory tax burdens, can 
only be explained by a constitutionally special status of these businesses. 
The Press Clause provides the only obvious basis for this status. The 
proper analysis in evaluating these regulations involves two steps. First, 
it involves accepting that the Press Clause establishes that these 
regulations must meet particular constitutional standards, a conclusion 
implicit in these regulations being so commonly challenged. Second, it 
involves giving a proper interpretation of the Press Clause, which I argue 
the Court has concluded is one that defers generally to the government, a 
                                                          
 227. Maybe not totally! A state tried to give husbands power to veto legal abortions by their 
wives, but the Court predictably invalidated the legislation. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52, 71 (1976). 
 228. Structural regulation might, for example, be a way to characterize legal regulation of the 
status of marriage, parenthood, parental authority, and guardianship—but the whole way of thinking 
about these differs greatly from the way of thinking about structural regulation of economic entities. 
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conclusion which I also argue follows from a proper theory of 
democracy. 
D. Summary 
The introduction to Part III argued that any differences in the 
constitutional status of media speech and other corporate speech can 
only be explained by the Press Clause. The investigation then found that 
legal differences abound. Most often they exist in non-constitutional 
legal policies that establish special privileges or exemptions for the 
media or particular portions of it. Few commentators argue that the 
Constitution requires most of these press privileges—ones that I have 
not discussed in Part III. Consider, for example, providing the press with 
special press facilities, press passes, and other access to government 
facilities, or waived charges for receipt of information under the 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). Few believe, however, that the 
press can constitutionally be denied other privileges or exemptions. That 
is true, I believe, in the case of being permitted to spend money on 
speech that identifies candidates for office or supports their candidacy 
during the period before elections, of using the name or persona of 
people to advance their profit interests when that usage involves 
inclusion in media content, or of a lesser duty of care owed to those who 
use or are affected by its product. 
Because of legislative overreaching, some differences between the 
press and other businesses are already a matter of constitutional doctrine. 
Protection of personal privacy from disclosures by various businesses, 
such as credit agencies, exists and the Court held it cannot be applied to 
media speech. Law also subjects businesses to many other regulations 
aimed at preserving degrees of privacy that would be unconstitutional if 
applied to regulating media content. Courts give media speech greater 
constitutional protection than other businesses’ profit-oriented speech 
(commercial speech) even when the two have the exact same content. In 
a different context, Justice White argued, and one suspects other Justices 
would agree if forced to face the issue, that the government can require 
that security advisors have a license that the government can deny or 
revoke for misbehavior, but that the First Amendment prevents imposing 
this requirement on journalists or the press. Compulsion to identify the 
fact that speech within the media was formulated and paid for by an 
outside party burdens or penalizes this outsider’s speech, a burden of the 
sort that Miami Herald held is unconstitutional in relation to the media’s 
own speech. Courts protect the media from discriminatory taxation, 
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protection that it denies other businesses.229 One area in which the Court 
failed to explicitly recognize this difference between types of businesses, 
namely defamation, resulted in an unfortunate perversion of doctrine. 
Even there, though, the propriety of recognizing this constitutional 
difference between the press and other businesses reasserted itself in 
practice through the way the standard, “matter of public concern,” is 
applied. Overall, vast areas of law would be disrupted by any failure to 
recognize the special constitutional status of the media—presumably 
based on the Press Clause. 
IV. PROBLEMS WITH SEPARATE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE 
PRESS MORE APPARENT THAN REAL 
Commentators have alleged various problems with reading the 
Press Clause to provide independent protection of the press. Some 
objections really only apply to particular asserted special rights. Often, 
the right response is that a sound interpretation of the Press Clause 
would not recognize that particular asserted right. In the context of 
objecting to any special rights for the press as compared to individual 
speakers in the defamation area, Steve Shiffrin provocatively argues that 
“[t]he idea that the [F]irst [A]mendment protections should be 
consciously divvied out in more generous doses to those with 
knowledge, wealth, and capacity to cause damage is indefensible.”230 
Shiffrin is right. Note, however, that the only differences identified in 
Part II between the speech rights of individuals and the press were where 
the press had the lesser right. This reflects that both have the same right 
in relation to freedom from censorship but that the individual has 
additional rights related to personal liberty or autonomy. In the specific 
area that concerned Shiffrin, defamation, both the theory of separate 
speech and press rights and the Court’s actual holdings properly suggest 
identical constitutional rights231—a result consistent with Shiffrin’s 
argument. Moreover, in contrast to many constitutionally gratuitous 
privileges of the press, such as receiving press facilities, the particular 
constitutional rights that it arguably has that individuals do not have, 
especially a reporter’s privilege to keep sources confidential, is more a 
benefit to the reporters and their capacity to perform their constitutional 
                                                          
 229. See supra Part III.C.3. 
 230. Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 915, 934 (1978). 
 231. This aspect of Dun & Bradstreet is unimpeachable but did contradict Justice Stewart’s 
own development of the Fourth Estate theory. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 
472 U.S. 749, 773 (1985). 
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role of serving the people than to the media’s wealthy owners.232 A 
reporter’s privilege, and probably other rights related to institutional 
integrity of the media, have a complex relation to the circumstances of 
the politically or economically weak and vulnerable. On the whole, 
however, to the extent these rights or privileges better enable the media 
to perform its watchdog role, they are often likely to especially benefit 
those less powerful and will often contribute to information that benefits 
the democratic process. 
Other commentators fear that a Fourth Estate constitutional status 
for the press will lead to demands for accountability or regulation as a 
public fiduciary that are inconsistent with the press’s, and especially the 
journalist’s, historical and proper nature “as a freebooter outside the 
system.”233 Possibly! Still, there seem to me three persuasive responses 
to this fear. First, any proper interpretation of a special status should 
invalidate any attempt to impose formal (behavioral) accountability.234 
Reading the Press Clause as a structural provision should give the press 
protection precisely against such attempts. Of course, a proper 
interpretation of the special constitutional status of the press cannot be 
assured. Nevertheless, the possibility of an objectionable interpretation 
should not be used as an excuse to avoid an interpretation that otherwise 
makes sense and serves democracy235—any contrary view would likely 
wipe out all constitutional law. Second, though under a proper 
interpretation of the Press Clause accountability cannot be legally 
enforced, society would benefit from frequent popular and public 
demands that the press properly live up to its constitutional role. 
Democracy is served both by a free media and by media criticism. 
Third, I admit the attraction of Anthony Lewis’s romantic vision of 
freebooter outside the system.236 I would go further. Not only does the 
communications order, as I have argued in three books, need legally-
based structural reform to prevent profit-maximizing concerns of both 
                                                          
 232. If Press Clause protection of the press’s institutional integrity prevents the government 
from paying the press to present the government’s message as the press’s own, the rule protects 
journalism at the cost of reducing owners’ flexibility in making profits.  
 233. Lewis, supra note 20, at 605; see also Van Alstyne, supra note 20, at 768-70. 
 234. Cf. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (“A responsible press 
is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and 
like many other virtues it cannot be legislated.”). 
 235. See Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1976) (quoting Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (“A responsible press has always been regarded as the 
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this 
regard is documented by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The press does not 
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice . . . .”). 
 236. Lewis, supra note 20, at 605. 
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media corporations and their advertisers from undermining these 
“freebooters,” which would also undermine the quality of journalism in 
the press and creativity in the cultural media. The communications order 
also depends on Lewis’s strong-willed media professionals remaining 
committed to their journalistic ideals. Often legislative structural 
interventions and journalists’ commitments are alike in one respect. 
Both often oppose the profit orientation of (many) owners. A key aim of 
both is to assure journalists more opportunities to perform their 
professional roles as they understand these roles. On the whole, this 
country has received great benefit from having such strong-willed, 
committed journalists and editors. The legal question is how the legal 
order can best nourish this spirit among journalists and editors. My 
guess is that culturally and legally recognizing the special constitutional 
importance of their role is more likely to contribute than an approach 
that views journalists and editors merely like any other workers 
employed by any other profit-oriented business.237 
Commentators also raise questions concerning constitutional 
history. Chief Justice Burger, for example, raised this issue in his 
concurrence in Bellotti, arguing that there was no historical grounding 
for a special reading of the Press Clause.238 Putting aside, I think, 
persuasive objections to how history should influence constitutional 
interpretation, Burger seems to be simply wrong about history. Much 
better supported is the view that “[h]istorically, there is little doubt that 
the Press Clause was viewed as having independent significance.”239 
Most critiques of independent content for the Press Clause 
emphasize a final problem: the difficulty of defining “the press.”240 
Here, I do not propose any canonical solution but, instead suggest some 
partial responses. First, however, I wish to express some dismay at the 
claim. At the 2007 annual meeting of the American Association of Law 
Schools, on different two section panels, two distinguished scholars, one 
from Columbia and one from Chicago, despite finding important 
normative and practical reasons for giving the press special protection, 
rejected reading the Press Clause as providing this because of the 
difficulty of definition.241 The same point is ubiquitous in scholarly 
                                                          
 237. See generally Anderson, supra note 11 (providing some illustrations of this spirit among 
media professionals and the opposite among financial consultants).  
 238. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 436 U.S. 765, 796-802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).  
 239. FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 31, at 56; see also Anderson, supra note 11, at 533-37.  
 240. This difficulty, continually expressed by both commentators and Justices, probably began 
for the Court with Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703 (1972). 
 241. See AALS Annual Meeting, http://www.aals.org/am2007/program.html (last visited July 
31, 2007). 
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writing. But line-drawing problems are ever present in constitutional 
law. Does speech include nude dancing?242 The real difficulty of 
defining or identifying speech does not justify ignoring the Speech 
Clause. When history and normative theory both suggest the propriety of 
an independent interpretation of the Press Clause, courts should face up 
to the difficult task of line-drawing, recognizing that here, as everywhere 
else, the edges will require controversial judgments. Both grey areas and 
occasional lapses in judgment are inevitable. Still, the protection that the 
courts do provide will generally serve the purposes of a society that 
accepts judicial review. The difficulties here are little different from 
interpretative difficulties in constitutional interpretation more generally. 
A. Difficulties of Definition243 
The necessity of defining the press is no stranger to the law. David 
Anderson notes, in a very partial listing, that “the press gets preferential 
access to legislative chambers, executive news conferences, trials, war 
zones, disaster scenes, prisons, and executions. State and local statutes 
protect the press from otherwise legal police searches.”244 Anderson 
continues, noting state “shield laws” that create “reporters’ privileges,” 
exemptions “from some securities regulations and campaign-expenditure 
limitations,” “special postal rates,” fee waivers for information sought 
by FOIA requests, and, in California, the right to receive from the police 
the “addresses of arrestees and crime victims” when sought for 
“journalistic purposes.”245 In each case, the law either formally or in 
practice had to define the press—or, at least, had to offer some way to 
determine who are the beneficiaries of the governmentally-created right. 
Most observers, however, do not find these ubiquitous definitions much 
help for constitutional purposes. The rights Anderson identified are all at 
least arguably gratuitous. Given that it is well established that some 
media entities, even some within the same rough category, can be given 
privileges that the government denies to other media entities, the law can 
grant these privileges either to a narrower or broader category than the 
                                                          
 242. Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289-90 (2000).  
 243. Though I mostly follow conventional practice and use the term “definition,” that usage 
should not be taken to mean a precise linguistic formulation. Rather, it seems more likely that the 
notion of the press will involve an overlapping set of features no one of which is essential, but taken 
together can allow relatively clear application with some border line cases. These features or 
“family resemblances” might be better described as representing a conception than a definition. 
 244. Anderson, supra note 11, at 432.  
 245. Id. at 432, 445.  
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“press” in its constitutional sense.246 It is this constitutional definition or 
conception of the press that must be specified. As to constitutionally 
claimed rights, since an entity gets the right if, but only if, it is the press, 
excluding an entity properly defined as the press would seem to violate 
its rights—thus, precise definition seems to be required.247 
A first mechanical step toward definition is purely descriptive. The 
claim is that the media’s product is speech—or more generally, 
communicative, whether verbal, visual, musical or some combination—
while other businesses’s products are non-communicative for which they 
then use (commercial) speech to aid in selling. (I will say more below 
about whether the First Amendment term “press” should be treated as 
referring to the mass media generally or only to some sub-category such 
as the “news media” or media engaged in the “journalistic function.” 
David Anderson gives strong reasons to favor the narrower 
conception.)248 This speech-product formulation does not quite work. As 
noted in Part III, speech is also the product of a number of businesses 
that few would consider the “press” or even “mass media”—consider 
                                                          
 246. See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 453 (1991) (holding that a state can grant 
tax exemption to one entity but not another even though they are in the same media category, video 
delivery services); Committee for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst, 704 F.2d 467, 481 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that law can grant newspapers an exemption from antitrust act even though only some 
newspapers qualify and their exemption can harm other papers that are not exempted); Sherrill v. 
Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (not challenging aspect of policy that makes only 
Washington-based journalists eligible for Justice White House press pass); Los Angeles Free Press, 
Inc. v. City of L.A., 88 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (upholding policy of only granting 
daily papers providing certain daily police and fire stories receive press passes). 
 247. Anderson suggests, however, maybe not. Anderson, supra note 11, at 68-69, 91-98. Given 
the instrumental basis of the Press Clause as serving the public, it might be adequate to hold that the 
relevant right does not necessarily go to particular rights-bearing parties or to all members of the 
press as long as the right exists for elements of the press in a manner beneficial to the public. As a 
matter of constitutional law, courts would determine where the type of right in question exists, but 
would defer to the government’s determination that a particular claimant should not receive it, at 
least should defer as long as the government’s definition is neither arbitrary nor exercised for 
invalid reasons and extends to sufficient elements of the press that the press’s constitutional role is 
served. This approach arguably embodies Justice Stewart’s insight that press freedom is an 
institutional right. Essentially this approach is now used in practice in respect to many of the 
gratuitous press rights mentioned above. 
  The unusual nature of this approach reflects, and can be justified, on the ground that while 
most rights are for the benefit of individuals and hence it violates their right if they are improperly 
denied the right, press rights exist to benefit the amorphous public and as long as the rights are 
given adequate scope to provide this benefit, individual claimants have no grounds to object if 
excluded. Anderson applies this argument in the context of arguing that “the press,” but not any 
particular person claiming to be a part of the press, must be given access to war zones. Id. 
 248. Anderson, supra note 11, at 436-47; see also Anderson, supra note 20, at 52 (“When I use 
the term media, I mean to cast a wider net, to include not only the press but also media entities that 
do not have plausible claims to Press Clause protection.”). 
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accountants, financial advisors, lawyers, doctors, or psychiatrists.249 In 
the defamation case discussed earlier, no Justice or judge in the lower 
courts thought Dun & Bradstreet was the press although its primary 
product was speech. The obvious distinction may be that the media or 
the press makes the same product non-selectively available to a broad 
public.250 Denying Press Clause protection for individualized 
professional or commercial communications—lawyers’ work or credit 
reports, for example—creates no problem for individuals’ typical non-
market oriented speech251 since this speech is fully protected under the 
liberty or autonomy theory of the Speech Clause. 
Justice Stewart, in his defense of an independent interpretation of 
the Press Clause argued that “[t]he publishing business is . . . the only 
organized private business that is given explicit constitutional 
protection.”252 Following Justice Stewart’s lead, the criterion suggested 
above allows a distinction between the press and other businesses. 
One red-herring should be mentioned. Sometimes those who assert 
a practical impossibility of identifying the press argue that conglomerate 
ownership and technological online convergence eliminate any historical 
capacity to identify the press. After purchasing a newspaper or network 
or setting up a web site, is General Electric the “press,” and thus a 
beneficiary of the rights of the press? The question is more imposing 
when expressed this generally than when asked in relation to a particular 
right of the press—that is, when asked in places where it matters. When 
so narrowed, General Electric’s web site or its expenditures on campaign 
“advertising” or other speech unassociated with its media “properties” is 
likely to constitute commercial speech. In contrast, its newspapers or 
broadcast network (including the newspapers’ or network’s web site) 
may be protected from various regulations in relation to their specific 
media activities. The law can and constantly does deal with corporate 
                                                          
 249. See infra Part III.B. 
 250. This criterion hides a complexity that might be decided either way. Should a business that 
limits the people to whom it will disclose its reports still be considered the “press”? If the press is 
protected because of its Fourth Estate role or because of its being the most important institution of a 
democratic public sphere where speech is presumptively addressed to all, no one should be denied 
access to its communications. Then the idea of a press that refused to make its product available to 
some willing to pay the cover price would contradict its democratic role and the non-exclusive 
requirement would be appropriate. On the other hand, the significance of limited public spheres of 
subaltern publics, a feature of complex democracy, infra note 270 and accompanying text, might 
justify greater sympathy for at least some claims of being the press despite audience selectivity. 
 251. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979) (protecting teacher from 
dismissal for her private conversations with the school principal about allegedly racially 
discriminatory policies). 
 252. Stewart, supra note 9, at 633. 
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parts. Few rights related to the institutional integrity of the press would 
sensibly apply to General Electric as a whole—in fact, in structurally 
supporting press freedom, the law could prohibit General Electric from 
owning these media entities—while press rights can apply to the 
activities or practices of the specific media “properties” that General 
Electric owns. 
Commentators also often note that the First Amendment should 
protect the lonely pamphleteer just as much as The New York Times or 
CBS even though the pamphleteer “sells” no product. Two not 
inconsistent routes to understanding protection for this pamphleteer are 
available: recognize her liberty rights as an individual speaker or treat 
her as the press by analogy to the characterizations of the so-called 
institutional press. As for the first route, the pamphleteer’s speech—her 
pamphlet—is surely protected simply on the basis of the Speech 
Clause.253 As noted in Part II, any occasional difference between the 
press and individual in relation to their “speech” rights favors the 
individual. Under existing law, the pamphleteer has speech rights 
apparently not available to the commercial media, for example, a right of 
anonymity that does not apply to the ownership of the commercial 
press.254 Moreover, if the issue were raised, I suspect that these 
pamphleteers, in reliance on Barnette, would have rights not to be 
conduits for other speakers’ messages.255 
Doctrinally, this resolution is admittedly not very tidy. During the 
middle decades of the twentieth century, when the Supreme Court 
sometimes seemed to explicitly rest many decisions on the Press 
Clause,256 the Court put pamphleteers into the press category.257 Of 
course, this does not matter unless the press receives some special 
constitutional rights in comparison to individuals (Part III argues that 
they clearly receive special rights as compared to other businesses and 
                                                          
 253. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (describing law as interfering with “freedom 
of expression”). 
 254. Compare id. at 64-65 (invalidating city ordinance which prohibited distribution of 
pamphlets unless it identified the names and addresses of persons who prepared, distributed, or 
sponsored it), and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (invalidating statute 
that prohibited distribution of campaign literature unless it contained identifying information), with 
39 U.S.C.A. § 3685 (2000) (requiring each owner of a publication having periodical publication 
mail privileges to provide the government and publish in the publication once a year information 
properly identifying the editor, managing editor, publishers, and owners as well as various other 
information specified by the statute or the Postal Service), and Post Office Appropriations Act of 
1912, Pub. L. No. 62-336, 37 Stat. 539, 553-54 (1912) (same except required twice a year). 
 255. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  
 256. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 448. 
 257. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938). 
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also are discretionarily given rights as compared to individuals by 
legislation or policy). If it does, are pamphleteers also the beneficiary? 
The relevant area lies in the possibility that the press receives “defensive 
rights” that protect its institutional integrity.258 The continuing 
controversy about the privilege to protect confidential sources presents 
the obvious test case. If the privilege exists, the most obvious argument 
is that when individuals, even on a non-commercial basis, seek out 
information not merely because of their own curiosity, but precisely in 
order to then communicate their “edited” or selected finding to a broad 
public, they are performing a central function of Justice Stewart’s 
constitutional business and should receive the same protection. In the 
context of blogging, at least one court has reached this conclusion, 
giving the web site editors contesting a subpoena the same right as a 
journalist who works for the commercial mass media.259 On the 
argument here and as the court decided, the right should not go 
automatically to all bloggers, but should depend on the purposes of the 
individual blogger when she gathered the information.260 
The possibility of these alternative doctrinal approaches to the 
lonely pamphleteer (today, the blogger) suggests two points. First, 
though the commercial press should be evaluated solely under the 
rationale of the Press Clause and, thereby be distinguished both from the 
individual who has obvious liberty interests in her speech and from other 
businesses, arguably the lonely pamphleteer or part-time “volunteer” 
                                                          
 258. The term “defensive rights” is taken from BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH, supra note 19, at 225; Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 
supra note 19, at 839. Following Justice Stewart’s analysis, I suggested that the Press Clause should 
be understood to establish special right that are inherent in, that “defend,” the institutional integrity 
of press entities but not “offensive rights,” that is, rights, as an initial matter, to engage in behavior 
not permitted for other people—such as to violate the speed limit or break and enter an office in 
order to get a story or to have unique, constitutionally protected access to governmental files. 
Stewart consistently favored what I characterized as “defensive rights” but not “offensive rights.” 
Id. at 837-48. 
 259. O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). After finding 
that the petitioners should receive the benefit of California’s statutory reporter privilege, the Court 
also found that the petitioners should receive the constitutional privilege arising from the California 
and federal constitutional guarantees of a free press. In so holding, the court said of the petitioners: 
“It is established without contradiction that they gather, select, and prepare, for purposes of 
publication to a mass audience, information about current events of interest and concern to that 
audience . . . [i]f their activities and social function differ at all from those of traditional print and 
broadcast journalists, the distinctions are minute, subtle, and constitutionally immaterial.” Id. at 106. 
 260. The Court in Grady distinguished “the open and deliberate publication on a news-oriented 
Web site of news gathered for that purpose by the site's operators—with the deposit of information, 
opinion, or fabrication by a casual visitor to an open forum such as a newsgroup, chatroom, bulletin 
board system, or discussion group” and indicated that it was recognizing a privilege only for the 
former. Id. at 99.  
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journalist should not only have full Speech Clause protection but also, in 
appropriate cases, Press Clause protection. For example, it is possible 
that she can have both rights of anonymity or exemption from carriage 
obligations and, in an appropriate case, a “reporter’s privilege.” As to 
any specific issue, she should be able to claim the characterization that 
provides the greater protection. 
Second, earlier discussion suggested that the line-drawing problem 
for identifying the press may not present courts an insurmountable 
problem. Largely by using functional reasoning relating to the 
distinctions between the press and both individuals and other businesses, 
courts may be able to make practical decisions on a case-by-case basis. 
This approach, despite leaving grey areas, is not uncommon in 
constitutional law and in principle should not be any more troublesome 
here. The problem may, however, be reduced given the contexts in 
which identification is necessary. If the only evidence that a person is an 
embodiment of the press is her unadorned assertion, the difficulty of an 
accurate and principled evaluation of the claim is obvious. But the 
individual will not need to assert the status of the press for speech rights 
where the only (minimal) differences favor the individual. Offensive 
rights would apply in cases before outward evidence of being a 
journalist appear but, I have argued, the Press Clause does not justify 
this category of journalistic rights. Thus, the only context in which the 
issue must be resolved relates to “defensive rights.” There, the question 
of identification occurs, however, only after the person has done her 
investigations, sought out the confidential source, and thus occurs in a 
factual context where evaluating her claim about the nature of her 
activities will be more concrete and subject to more objective resolution. 
B. Journalism or Entertainment and Culture 
The First Amendment protects movies, art, music, and fiction.261 It 
would seem obvious that these can all be important forms of individual 
self-expression and, as such, receive full protection under the Speech 
Clause. Successful versions of these forms, however, are often the 
products of large-scale commercial development and exploitation. If 
businesses other than the press are subject to many restrictions and 
                                                          
 261. The Court has opined that the First Amendment “unquestionably shield[s] painting of 
Jackson Pollock, the music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carol.” Hurley v. 
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995); see also 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (holding that the First Amendment 
guarantees of the freedom of speech and of the press apply to motion pictures). 
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regulations of their speech that do not apply either to individuals or to 
the press, the obvious question is how to think of these forms of 
expression—often entertainment—when they are products of 
commercial entities. 
Historically, some theorists, most famously Alexander Meiklejohn, 
but also others including Robert Bork, would deny these cultural forms 
of expression First Amendment protection.262 After serious attack for 
drawing an unsustainable line of protecting only speech about public 
matters,263 Meiklejohn reversed course and saw that these media 
nourished reflective thought on which democracy depends.264 Though he 
did not engage in any discussion of possible distinctions between speech 
and the press, given his unwillingness to recognize any protection for 
commercial speech of business enterprises, he was necessarily 
committed to some type of distinction between the products of some 
cultural or media businesses from those of other businesses—and a role 
for the Press Clause logically follows.265 
Nevertheless, many First Amendment commentators, probably 
most journalists and likely many professionals in the entertainment 
business, see the “press” as the portion of the media oriented toward 
current affairs and public policy—basically journalism266 and related 
expression historically identified with newspapers.267 Likewise, if either 
history or Justice Stewart’s image of the Fourth Estate is the impetuous 
for understanding the special nature of the press, probably these cultural 
expressions would not be included. What defines the press is the 
provision of “news.” 
Still, the issue of scope merits more sustained consideration. 
Elsewhere I have argued that a democracy needs protection for 
production and distribution of information and vision independent of the 
governmental dictates and control.268 Entertainment and cultural media 
                                                          
 262. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 46 
(1948); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 
(1971). 
 263. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 899 (1949) (book review). 
 264. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 
256-57 (including other forms of expression, such as philosophy, literature, and art, in his definition 
of “political speech”).  
 265. Id. at 258-59.  
 266. Anderson, supra note 11, at 445-47. 
 267. Interestingly, in the nineteenth century, newspapers regularly combined “news” with 
publication of often serialized fiction and poetry. Today, one need only think of The New Yorker to 
recognize that publications often combine these varying types of content. 
 268. C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 890, 898, 919 
(2002). 
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play central roles in stimulating, exploring, critiquing, and ratifying 
ways that people think of themselves, their society, and the issues that 
confront them. Moreover, these media do so with a sensibility for human 
flaws and weaknesses, with a capacity for inspiring change, and with 
recognition of human variability that effectively debate and teach much 
that is relevant for public as well as private self-government. 
If the First Amendment protects the press for its service to 
democracy, a proper conception of the press would depend on what mass 
communications a democracy requires. The answer to this question 
depends, in turn, on the appropriate conception of democracy. Elsewhere 
I outlined arguments for four models or ideal type conceptions of 
democracy—elite, liberal pluralist, republican, and complex.269 There I 
argued that “complex democracy” was both normatively most appealing 
and descriptively most in line with existing Court doctrine. Complex 
democracy argues that a free society requires not only both republican or 
inclusive discourses aimed at forming conceptions of the public good 
and liberal discourses aimed at obtaining fair bargains between different 
groups, but also internal discourses within subgroups of society aimed at 
these subgroups’ self-understanding and identity formation. Without this 
last category of discourse and, presumably, the media that serves it, the 
likelihood of marginalization and ultimately the oppression of subaltern 
groups270 is huge. It seems that cultural media are crucial both for the 
broader society to understand itself, a crucial step in the republican 
search for a common good, and possibly even more so (and more 
endangered) for subgroups to be able to debate and form or understand 
their otherwise marginalized identity. If this conception of democracy is 
accepted, it provides an ample democratic reason to interpret the Press 
Clause expansively as protecting these broader forms of cultural media. 
V. CONCLUSION: WHY IT MATTERS 
The constitutional order has long done without any explicit 
recognition of an independent interpretation of the Press Clause.271 So it 
                                                          
 269. C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 129-53 (2002). The model I label 
complex democracy, which combines elements of liberal pluralist and republican democracy plus 
adding emphasis on internal self-definitional discourses of subgroups, duplicates closely 
Habermas’s discourse theory of democracy. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACT AND NORM 118-
31 (1996). 
 270. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 109-142 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992). 
 271. But see supra note 11 (discussing but doubting the significance of reliance on the press 
clause between the 1930s and the 1960s). 
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is natural to ask, does this issue really matter (much)? A plausible 
answer is: “no.” First, not only has the legal order, the country, and the 
press gotten along until now without recognition of an independent 
(judicial) interpretation of the Press Clause, but radical commentators 
who claim to be more critical of the history of the country, of the legal 
order, and even of the operating press seldom attribute the problem to 
this corner of constitutional law. Even the legal areas I have discussed in 
this Article have done relatively well without explicit acceptance of this 
interpretation. Second, freedom from censorship—(purposeful) 
government penalties on the communicator’s chosen content—is surely 
the most important guarantee provided by the First Amendment’s 
constitutional protection of expression. As long as this stands, other 
concerns can mostly take care of themselves. In particular, the press is 
usually well positioned to convince the government of the utility of 
various privileges that will help it perform its constitutional role. 
Still, this answer is unwelcome. The Court and the law should get it 
right! History and normative theory both support the independent 
interpretation. Although a relatively intellectualized point, as long as 
existing legal doctrine (and other results that are clearly appropriate if 
the issue arises constitutionally) requires the assumption of an 
independent status to the Press Clause, the absence of this interpretation 
denies the important virtues of clarity, coherence, and consistency to the 
law. More pragmatically, without this recognition, the tensions 
embedded in existing law can be a source of legal instability that could 
lead to wrong results and a failure to provide appropriate guidance as to 
new issues. Thus, these final remarks explore five pragmatic 
considerations that indicate the importance of formally recognizing the 
independent status of the Press Clause that the Article shows is already 
implicit in existing law. 
First, only such recognition will prevent the obvious democratic 
importance of press freedom from giving general corporate interests a 
powerful but unjustified rhetorical edge in arguing that regulation of 
their speech is constitutionally indistinguishable from regulating the 
press and, hence, impermissible. This phenomenon has recently been 
most evident in the campaign finance debate. The refrain is either: “if 
the government can restrict our expenditures, the press should tremble 
because its speech freedom will also be at the mercy of the legislature;” 
or, “since the government cannot do this to the press, it similarly cannot 
do it to other corporations.” Whatever the merits of various regulations 
of businesses’ speech, the judgment about that policy issue should not be 
influenced by the fact that some of these regulations could not and 
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should not be applied to the press. Only recognition of the independent 
status of the Press Clause prevents this distortion of proper policy 
debate—and, when relevant, only this recognition will lead to proper 
court holdings. 
Second, though acting within legislative halls and with popular 
support, the press often is able to protect rights essential to its integrity, 
government administrations come and go; popular opinion is fickle. 
Many see popular support for the press recently to have been at a low 
ebb and see the Bush administration to be particularly indifferent to the 
integrity of the press. Only recognition of the independent status of the 
Press Clause provides legal security for this important democratic 
institution. Moreover, for those properly doubtful of the power of court 
decisions where the spirit of the people is not behind it, in the case of 
finding an independent meaning for the Press Clause the courts would be 
ratifying largely popular understandings of the constitutional status of 
the press. In doing so, the courts would be reinforcing and most likely 
contributing to the stability of this important value. 
Third, recognition of the constitutional basis of protecting the 
institutional integrity of the press provides a foundation for properly 
addressing new or previously unrecognized threats to that integrity.272 
For example, my defense of the press’s independence in Part II-A 
considered two issues, one well worn (reporter’s privilege) and the other 
virtually unknown within the existing legal literature. The novel claim 
was that the integrity of the institution could be undermined equally by, 
to use Justice Stewart’s words, the government “annex[ing] the 
journalistic profession as an investigative arm of government” or by the 
government using payments to “annex” the watchdog by making it a 
secret mouthpiece of the government.273 Recognizing the independent 
status of the press provides a basis to understand, evaluate, and arguably 
invalidate both institutional threats as well as others not now evident and 
that may have not yet even arisen. 
Fourth, only through recognition of the independent status of the 
press will courts not be placed in the position of distorting proper 
constitutional doctrine in trying to reach the right results as, at least so I 
argued, occurred in the case of defamation law in response to the issues 
posed by Dun & Bradstreet.274 
                                                          
 272. See supra Part II.A. 
 273. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
 274. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, as a parallel to the first point above, failure to recognize the 
press’s unique constitutional special status creates the danger that proper 
regulation of the press will be thwarted not on the merits but because of 
analogizing the press to individuals. Jerome Barron’s advocacy of access 
rights, with which this Article began, raises complex issues concerning 
the proper understanding of the Press Clause. This analysis would be 
improperly truncated (in a manner inconsistent with existing Supreme 
Court precedent!) if the instrumental and institutional constitutional 
status of the press were not recognized. Without this recognition, 
provisions that compel media carriage of outsiders’ speech (especially 
for communications contrary to the ideological views of the relevant 
decision-makers within a media entity) would seem to interfere with 
press autonomy the same way the compelled speech interfered with the 
liberty of the schoolchild in Barnette.275 
Rejection of an independent meaning of the Press Clause blinds 
analysis. It leads both to the view that there is no First Amendment-
based distinction between the press and individual speakers, a view that 
Part II shows is rejected by existing constitutional law (as well as 
statutory law) and to the view that there are no First Amendment based 
distinctions between the press and other businesses, a view that Part III 
shows existing constitutional law (as well as statutory law) rejects. The 
only conclusion can be that, though unacknowledged, existing law 
embodies an independent role for the Press Clause—essentially, some 
version of Justice Stewart’s Fourth Estate theory.276 
Both the press and a democratic country obviously can get by 
without an independently interpreted Press Clause in its Constitution. 
This absence leaves no vital human right subject to simple governmental 
abridgment, nor prevents the possibility of having a robust and free 
press. Largely because of its lobbying capacity, the press is likely to 
secure most of the privileges and exemptions that serve a society, as well 
as some that do not, from either the legislature, executive, or the 
administrative agencies. Nevertheless, this Article has claimed that 
failure to acknowledge an independent status of the Press Clause of the 
United States Constitution is not only a theoretical mistake, contrary to 
the historical meaning of the Press Clause and contrary to the best 
normative interpretation of the Constitution and, as this conclusion has 
argued, a potentially significant pragmatic mistake. It is also inconsistent 
with existing law. 
                                                          
 275. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 276. See Stewart, supra note 9, at 634.  
